

Comments on "The Scope and Field of Sociology" as
read by Sister Mechtraud, S. Sp. S., before the
Philippine Sociological Society.

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I fully agree with Sister Mechtraud's broad definition of sociology as a science of society, the science which treats of man's relation with his fellowmen. Having in mind man's social life, we might state the definition of sociology in another way by saying that it is a science of human relationship. Social life is that part of man's life which is spent in a group—primary or secondary—be it organized or unorganized. It concerns itself with all our social dealings, whether these be cooperative or competitive in nature.

I also share with her the idea that when we speak of "man" in sociology we always have in mind the fact that he is a creature of God with an animal body but with a human soul, endowed by Him with intellect and free will; that man as a rational Being is capable of forming a society with other men. It is in this society that men in the course of time formulate, acquire, and practice certain social values and norms which govern social behavior.

We cannot, therefore, conceive of any idea of the science of sociology developing without having in mind the concept and nature of man, since without him society cannot exist. And as we say that sociology is the science of society, so it follows that without society there is no science of sociology.

In our study of human knowledge, we learn that it may be broadly classified into two general divisions: the natural science and the social science. Natural sciences are those that deal with nature, while social sciences treat of the life of man in his relation with his fellowmen. It is in this respect that man becomes the object of study of the science of sociology. However, "the biological sciences study man as a living organism; anatomy studies the structure of the organism; physiology, the functions of the organism; pathology, the effects of disease upon organism; and physical anthropology, the typical variations in the external features of man".

In the attainment of truth about nature and man, two methods may be employed. The first is called the inductive, or a *posteriori* method. This is what we employ especially in the study of natural sciences. The second method of attaining truth is called the deductive, or a *priori* method. This is what we use especially in the study of the science of sociology. However, now that sociology is becoming of age as a science, the a-posteriori method is equally being employed by present day sociologists.

But unlike all other science which use the a-posteriori method, "clearly, sociologists cannot bring society into the laboratory; it cannot put men into test tubes and retorts. Yet, sociology is a science; it uses scientific method. The scientific method does not consist of the use of mechanical gadgets, however valuable they may be in some sciences. Science is a method of arriving at an understanding of man, of the universe, and of man's place in the universe. It is a method of acquiring knowledge. As such, it is used by the sociologist as well as by the chemist."

Some Views of Sociology, Social Sciences, and Scientific
Objectives: Being a Selected Compilation and Dis-
cussion of Methods, Objectives, and Ends of
Human Attitudes.

CHARLES O. HOUSTON, JR.

Sociology is now a respected discipline for the study of man in society. Many of its original objectives, however, have been pre-empted by the other social sciences to such an extent, it appears, that sociologists have become social technologists and social anthropologists the technocrats. In the United States, the lines between sociology and social anthropology have become blurred (see below), but in the Philippines neither is so well established as to inhibit beginnings in either discipline. Both are in the fetal stage, so it seems necessary to devote some discussion to what we hope sociology can contribute in future decades to an understanding of the particular problems faced by the people of the Philippines. Desiderata in studies of Philippine society are manifold; workers are few, and those attempting sociological work are hampered by (1) a general lack of understanding as to what sociology is and what its importance can be in Philippine academic life, and (2) by rather vague or contradictory views held by those persons interested in sociology, either as a career or as an additional tool in their own discipline.

This paper is meant as an introduction to a solution of this problem. As such, it will concern itself with a compilation of views held by various authorities in the past thirty years—frankly an appeal to authority, in view of the author's orientation as an historian. It will also present the author's view as to the scope and role of sociology in the Philippines and what he believes as to the general application of the social sciences to a study of man in society, through scientific method.

Perhaps the clearest discussion of the beginnings of sociology is to be found in R. M. MacIver's contribution to the *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*:

The history of sociology can be circumscribed within a century or two or it can be extended to cover the whole range of human reflection on society from the remote past, according to the degree to which the scientific desideratum implicit in the term is emphasized. Sociology, as a more or less definite body of systematic knowledge with a distinctive place and name among the family of sciences, must be dated by decades rather than by centuries. The reasons for this late emergence are significant of far reaching changes in the conception of society itself, without which a science of society could not have been born.

The nearest approach to a genuine sociology before the present age was made by the Greek philosophers. The distinction which the sophists drew between nature (*physis*) and convention (*nomos*) was of signal importance, for, distinguishing laws of nature from those of society, it made the social for, distinguishing laws of nature from those of society, it made the social sanctity which precluded its scientific study. Their main objective was not scientific study but a revolutionary ethic; the challenge which they offered,

could, however, be met only in the spirit of free investigation. It was in this spirit that the challenge was taken up by Plato and Aristotle, who sought in epoch making formulations to show that society was the inherent condition of human fulfillment; that in this sense it was prior to the individual; that its essential structure, apart from the particular historical variations and degenerations to which it is subject, arose out of the inborn impulses of man; and that its essential bond, the justice which achieves the ordered functioning of a social system, is not merely an imposition of the strong subjugating the weak or of the weak seeking to fetter the strong but a principle of union expressive of the organic community of social animals...¹

...Greek thought on society never takes specific sociological form... In the last resort the obstacle was the inability of the Greeks to distinguish the concept of community from that of state, the same inability which in another manifestation was responsible for the fact that the Greek political ideal never transcended the bounds set by the walls of a small city.

In Rome

...the Roman preoccupation with law obscured the view of the non-legalistic aspects of society. In so far as the latter required interpretation, there came to hand, in Cicero, for example, the convenient principle of natural law, which, however, remained normative, not descriptive or constitutive. The transition from natural law to natural social process, which would have prepared the way for a science of society, was nowhere made explicit. While it was generally admitted that man was not only, in the older language of the city-state, a *zoon politikon* but also a being whose nature demanded the universal conditions of society, the actual processes of social relationships were taken for granted, save in respect to their conformity to or deviation from an ethical or a legal norm.²

We might inject, parenthetically, that the last sentence quoted above could be taken as a keen alaysis of present-day Philippines.

MacIver's discussion continues with an analysis of the developments in philosophy through the Middle Ages which inhibited a growth of true sociological thought and we will return to this discussion later in our discussion on the meaning of sociology to the Philippine scene. In any event, the years through the Middle Ages and the beginnings of nation states brought with them a growth in philosophical approaches to man in society which eventually culminated in the schools of rationality of the Seventeenth Century. This was to prove of enormous importance in man's concept of society and

...Sociology arose in the seventeenth century in opposition to the inextricable mixture of ethical and legal principles in the doctrine of Natural Law. This expression of an empirical attitude was an attempt, ultimately successful in certain respects, to distinguish between important elements of social behavior and outlook characteristic of Western society. The preoccupation with Western society constitutes the major unifying theme for problem, research, and theory of sociology throughout its history...³

¹R. M. MacIver: "Sociology," *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, Vol. 14, p. 232, *passim*. (New York: Macmillan)

²*Ibid.*, p. 233, *passim*.

³John W. Bennett & Kurt H. Wolff: "Toward Communication between Sociology and Anthropology," *Yearbook of Anthropology* 1955, Edited by W. L. Thomas, Jr., (N.Y.: Wenner-Gren Foundation for Anthropological Research, 1955, 836 pp.), p. 330.

From the close of the 18th Century, in

the contributions of men like Fichte and Novalis the old philosophy of history was reoriented as *Gesellschaftsphilosophie* and *Gesellschaftslehre*. For Fichte society meant the relation of reasoning beings to one another and the state was only a specific, empirically limited form of society. The positive character of society he found in reciprocity through freedom... From then on an essential problem was that of the relation of society to the state and consequently of *Gesellschaftslehre* to *Staatslehre*. While some of the German romantic school, like Schlegel and Adam Muller, continued to use the two terms almost interchangeably, the trend was in the opposite direction and even Hegel, for all his idealization of the state, made his own somewhat curious distinction between bourgeois society and the state. It remained only to bring this distinction from the realm of philosophy to that of science. In this process sociology as a definite subject was born.⁴

This birth occurred in 1837, through the lectures of Auguste Comte, who introduced the word *sociology*; these lectures resulted in his work *Positive Philosophy*, in itself significant of what sociology meant to Comte and his school.

Comte's intention in introducing the word has been widely misunderstood. It has been confused with the suggestions of practical change in polity and in religion, which, in the later part of his life, he advocated... Comte considered himself to be in succession with a line of thinkers historically beginning with Thales and Pythagoras, continuing with Bacon and Descartes, and culminating in Hume's 'Treatise of Human Nature', which attempted to unify and evaluate the total available knowledge of Man...⁵

That a change in the orientation toward the meaning of sociology has come about since the days of Comte and his school should not be surprising, since change is the essence of human society and of thought. The direction this change has taken during the 20th Century is quite indicative of the general orientation of thought toward human problems so characteristic of Western Civilization" if this term is defined so as to indicate "American" or "British" civilization. This change in orientation is simply the directing of sociology toward utilitarian ends, and can be noted in a survey of definitions of sociology and social science in textbooks during the past thirty years.

The conflict in thought, between sociology as philosophically conceived and carried on in Europe and its utilitarian pragmatism in America, is evident as early as 1924. Clarence M. Case, in that year, declared:

The practically important thing is to distinguish between sociology as a category in a rigidly logical classification of the sciences and sociology as a social work, and a considerable literature both periodical and occasional... It may indeed prove to be the leaven in the social sciences which, while leavening the whole lump with a more liberal, broad, and truly human point of view, is destined eventually itself to disappear. That is a question to be answered more by the logic of events than by the logic of the sciences. I do not, however, agree with some who have likened sociology to a tower around which the other social sciences are clustered. It does not thus overlook or overlord them, but is at most like a common courtyard into which they open, through

⁴MacIver, *Ibid.*, pp. 235-236, *passim*.

⁵Victor Brandford: "Sociology," *Encyclopedia Britannica*, Vol. 20, p. 911, (1956 printing). (Author was Chairman of Council, British Sociological Society)

which they must pass to and fro in bringing their more or less separate inquiries to a common point of view, and possibly sooner or later to a single body of organized knowledge about human society and culture.⁶

The very wording of this definition is significant, at once holistic in objective and pluralistic in method. This represents the conflict within the discipline of sociology still continuing and which was present in later pages of Case's discussion.

The distinctive contribution of sociology to the social studies is to show that, however much may be allowed for individual initiative and for natural environment, human life has been conditioned more by its social setting than by any other cause....

Sociology studies the various forms of causal relations between the activities of individuals that are always occurring in homes, schools, neighborhoods, crowds, ... and that give rise to public opinion, customs and institutions.

Sociology also studies the problems of population as affecting all types of social activity....

It studies the causes, prevention, and treatment of poverty and crime.

It makes a comparative study of different societies.

Sociology affords a clear view of the aims of education for it shows that distinctively human nature is second nature socially acquired and that if from birth one could be excluded from all social contacts he would remain a naked savage and a dumb brute....⁷

That many sociologists were not willing to accept the ultimate fate for their discipline as prognosticated by Case, and were determined to prove through their work and by their methods that sociology was pluralistically bound, is illustrated by all subsequent literature. Indeed, within a very few years after Case we encounter the beginnings of an attempt at method designed to prevent sociology's absorption into the other social sciences:

... we are calling the methodological scheme... *experimental sociology*.

It is sociological in the sense that its aim is the study of overt behavior in varying situations in the field of social interaction. It is experimental in the sense of developing techniques for the control of the observer in order that *scientific records*⁸ may be obtained both of behavior and of situation, and that statistical analysis—ultimately the necessary tool for evaluating behavior-situation relationships⁹—may eventually be applied.⁹

This is one of the earliest appeals to the magic of "science", designed to make of the social sciences respectable coordinates in the study of human behavior. This has been carried on (not only at Columbia's Teachers College, noted for its "scientific" approach to problems of education) through an intensification and broadening of what are considered "scientific" methodologies—mathematical, statistical, and other rigidly classificatory systems—which, today, has aided in bringing about the confusion within the discipline and between it and the other social disciplines. Case's

⁶ Clarence M. Case: *Outlines of Introductory Sociology. A Textbook of Readings in Social Science*. N.Y.: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1924, xxvi, 980 pp. Pages xxi-xxii.

⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 23-24, *passim*.

⁸ Dorothy S. Thomas, et al: *Some New Techniques for Studying Social Behavior*, N.Y.: Teachers College, Columbia Univ., 1929, x, 203 pp. Page 1.

⁹ Italics supplied.

hope that sociology would provide a "common courtyard" is still far short of reality, it would seem. This methodological approach, was advocated by Dr. Thomas because "Our present concern with the development of techniques is due to the fact that there have been so few attempts to obtain genuinely objective data in this field and, indeed, a rather general feeling that such attempts represented the measurement of the unmeasurable."⁹

This concern, this attempt, was mirrored very sharply in a later volume indicating the preoccupation of social scientists with the problems of their disciplines as well as their attempts to make of the various branches of the study of man in his society true "sciences." The work was edited by Stuart A. Rice,¹⁰ and was divided into nine supposedly related sections (all "case analyses"): "The Delimitation of Fields of Inquiry"; "The Definition of Objects of Investigation"; "The Establishment of Units and Scales" (very significantly); "Attempts to Discover Spatial Distributions and Temporal Sequences" (with an holistic objective?); "Interpretations of Change as a Developmental Stage"; "Interpretations of Relationship Among Unmeasured Factors"; "Attempts to Determine Relations Among Measured but Experimentally Uncontrolled Factors"; "Attempts to Determine Quantitative Relations among Measured and Experimentally Controlled Factors". These sections are followed by a series of appendices, illuminating, it was hoped, the foregoing analysis of case studies, among which (Appendix E) is the "Report of the Advisory Committee of the American Sociological Society" (pp. 749-752), which supplies brief comments on 22 works in sociology. These comments are most interesting as they bear directly upon this effort at integrating the social sciences into what might be termed "pure science". Whether or not this attempt was successful in this particular case, will be judged by each individual today on the basis of his own orientation toward his discipline. To this observer, the effort seems greater than the result—insofar as meeting its objective is concerned.

In any event, the path was laid out and sociologists directed their feet with varying intensity, along its way. Three years after the "Case Book" James H. S. Bossard published a pioneer work entitled, *Social Change and Social Problems*.¹¹ This was frankly utilitarian in orientation and method. Bossard was not narrow in his views, being much more philosophically inclined than the majority of his colleagues in the new discipline; he raised as many questions with regard to the future of sociology as constructing fields for its inquiry, particularly with reference to making of sociology a functional factor in social studies.

Applied sociology may be defined as sociology with a practical purpose.... applied sociology seeks to utilize the knowledge and understanding which the science of sociology has developed to the accomplishment of certain desired social ends.... On the other hand, applied sociology is not social work. The former is a science; the latter, a technique and an art. As such, social work is dependent upon all of the social sciences which impinge upon its province...¹²

⁹ *Ibid.*

¹⁰ *Method in Social Science. A Case Book*. (Compiled under the Direction of the Committee on Scientific Method in the Social Sciences, the Social Science Research Council.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1931, viii, 822 pp.. Note the intensity of effort this indicates: this was determination, not a "trend".

¹¹ N.Y.: Harper & Bros., 1934, xii, 786pp.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 32.

It seems essential to keep this distinction quite clear in viewing the objectives and methods of sociology. Bossard was quite unique in his discipline for his clarity of thought and perception of the limits of functional sociology.

...Applied sociology can contribute to the development of an objective attitude toward social problems....

A second service which applied sociology can render is the objective description of social problems....

...It can contribute to an understanding of the causes, so called, of the problems involved.

...There are those... who insist that the sociological approach is a particular, restricted and unique one, separate from those of the other social sciences. Unfortunately, there is no agreement as to what this particular approach is, nor has the consensus of opinion among those taking this position always favored the same one, with the result that sociology has pursued, in the brief history of its development, a number of blind alleys. At the other extreme are those who insist that the sociological approach, especially that of applied sociology, is essentially a synthetic one, coordinating the findings of many sciences which touch in various ways the problems with which it is concerned.¹³

To avoid these blind alleys, he suggests that

Certain problems, such as poverty, population, crime delinquency, divorce, etc., are generally agreed upon as distinctive fields for sociological study. In dealing with these problems, shall the energies of sociologists be diverted to the maintenance of the vain divisions of esoteric cults, or shall they be applied to these problems?¹⁴

In view of the growing esotericity of cults within sociology, it is worth repeating Bossard's question again and again, particularly if sociology is to occupy the functional position Bossard and others envisaged. His observations and questions are still highly pertinent.

...Furthermore it is well to remember that pure sociologists coordinate the work of many different sciences and sources. The question may well be asked, therefore, whether such procedure is less scientific in the study of poverty than in the study of prestige, in the study of crime than in the analysis of social control.

Whatever the particular answer to this question, it is the hope of applied sociology to aid in the identification of the causative factors in the problems dealt with.

It must be confessed, with the humility which ought always to be characteristic of the true scientist, that applied sociology finds its work for the most part in the future, rather than in the past. In other words, much applied sociology still falls short of being scientific....

At this point, it may well be pointed out that the contributions of sociology thus far have been surprisingly few.

We must guard against letting sociology degenerate into mere scientific jargon which is but an elaboration of the obvious. Concepts are useful as

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 35.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

tools, but they must not be leaning posts for academic prattle, for worn-out theories, or for worthless ideas...¹⁵

We underline Bossard's hope for applied sociology because we are convinced it represents the major—the principal—function with which sociology in the Philippines should be concerned and to which its efforts should be devoted. We are convinced, also, that this has not been the case in the past and is not so today. We are as alarmed today as Bossard was in 1934 with the increasing use of jargon to disguise the obvious—a fault due, possibly, to the increasing familiarity with sociological concepts among the "laity" and the retreat into the esoteric by the professional hoping to retain all the priestly attributes the unknown bestows upon those who seek to interpret it. The danger, against which Bossard warns us in the above quotation is a growing one, if one examines contemporary sociological literature. For example, in a recent number of the *Research Studies of the State College of Washington*, devoted to the "Proceedings" of the Pacific Sociological Society for 1956, we encounter such articles as "Correlates of Primary Communication and Empathy,"¹⁶ which breaks down (not simply it must be added) into the simple question, How do you get along with your spouse?¹⁷ Or another, "Verbal Behavior in Problem-Solving Small Group,"¹⁸ which breaks down into "social confusion and how this affects efficiency," the main conclusion of the study being that "the individual who is most concerned with his role in society, rather than the one who thinks principally of himself first, is more popular and achieves leadership. This easily observable trait among humans, is here subjected to a 'scientific' analysis, recorded minute by minute."¹⁹ Or we encounter, "Mathematical Models in Sociology,"²⁰ an attempt to carry Dr. Thomas' theorem of "experimental sociology" to its logical conclusion: "An exercise in semantic definition, leading to the conclusion, inferentially expressed, that it would be better if more sociology be reduced to mathematical symbols"—rather than the symbolism of ordinary speech.²¹ Parenthetically, we might add that "Perhaps the day will yet dawn when sociologists will be able to talk exclusively in formulae and symbols and will have achieved the ultimate goal of specialists: complete and successful unintelligibility."²² This sociological pluralism is illustrated further by the other articles, "Individual Counseling and Group Psychotherapy with Paroled Drug Addicts,"²³ "Psychosomatic Complaints, Institutionalization and Delinquency,"²⁴ "Parent-Adolescent Relationships and Delinquent Behavior,"²⁵ and "Relationship of Crime and Horror Comics to Juvenile Delinquency."²⁶ We mention these rather trivial examples here because Dr. Bossard stated in 1934

It seems safe to say that not one major social problem with which applied sociology deals has been made the object of a comprehensive coordinated research program.... The failure to proceed in that direction lays sociologists open to criticism from non-sociologists as pursuing dilettante projects,

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-37, *passim*. Italics supplied.

¹⁶ By Locke, Sabagh and Thomas, pp. 116-124.

¹⁷ Comment by C. O. Houston, *University of Manila Journal of East Asiatic Studies*, Vol. V, No. 1 (January, 1956), p. 108. (Published, April, 1957).

¹⁸ By John James, pp. 125-133.

¹⁹ C. O. H., *Ibid.*, pp. 108-109.

²⁰ R. J. Hill, pp. 134-140.

²¹ C. O. H., *Ibid.*, p. 109.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ W. C. Bailey, pp. 141-149.

²⁴ J. F. Short, Jr., pp. 150-159.

²⁵ F. I. Nye, pp. 160-169.

²⁶ E. H. Pfuhl, Jr., pp. 170-177.

toying with vague problems of a relatively unimportant sort. One cannot escape commenting on the fact that such large-scale research attacks as have been made upon the major problems of applied sociology have resulted from the efforts and inspiration of other interested groups.

To the extent that applied sociology identifies causal factors in social problems with proper appraisal of their relative importance, it will indicate effective ways and points of remedial procedure....

Applied sociology can supply various concepts to the study of social problems.... Professor Eubañk has emphasized the value of such concepts as social attitude, value, wishes, conflict, culture complex, and social distance....

There is a great need for a consideration of social well-being from the stand point of society as a whole.... [Applied sociology] can develop a program comprehending all of society or programs dealing with specific problems, both based on an understanding of the entire societal situation. This, in other words, means social planning, based on a consideration of the needs of society as a whole.

...All this suggests [the idea of social control] then, another aspect of applied sociology, i.e., interest in the development of effective methods for the attainment of given ends....

Applied sociology must concern itself with values and objectives... As a matter of actual fact, the problem of values cannot be escaped.... What needs to be emphasized, as Hayes has shown, is that *these values shall be objectively determined*.

The history of sociology shows it to have had a dual origin: (1) in the desire for social improvement, and (2) in the search for understanding.²⁷

None of the objectives of applied sociology or, indeed sociology itself, can be approached until an understanding of "society" is achieved. This is a weakness of most textbooks on the subject; the term is used without functional definitions. An example of this is the textbook in current use in the Philippines which discusses Philippine society as if the term were thoroughly understood by all who would use the book. We find MacIver's approach to his discipline the most admirable of all authorities consulted. He has a definite objective in his texts, not the general one of explaining and illustrating sociology. And this, we believe, is the primary desideratum of such writing.

I have endeavored to lead the student towards an understanding of the peculiar and elusive system of reality we name *society*. It is in the progressive understanding of systems that all genuine knowledge abides—and all genuine education. A text, even an introductory text, should present, not an agglomeration of disconnected materials but the orderly exposition of that scheme of things which constitutes its proper subject matter.

What the proper subject matter of sociology is, what it includes and excludes, is still very imperfectly realized. In my judgment the chief difficulty is the frequent tendency to identify the social with what anthropologists call the "cultural", that is, with the whole area and range of human activity. Many general texts of sociology treat economic and religious and technological and other topics as part of their subject, for their own sake, as it were, and not for the light they throw on the questions of social relationship. There is, of course, no form of human activity which does not have, say, a psychological

²⁷ Bocsard, *op. cit.*, pp. 38-43, *passim*. Italics supplied.

aspect or an economic aspect. Our problem is first to disentangle the social factor, and then to interpret it by showing its dependence on or relation to the other factors of human life. Only thus can we avoid the embarrassing inclusion of multifarious subjects, without unity and without focus. *Only thus can we develop a distinctive subject matter of sociology.**

Sociology, concerned with the relationships of social beings as they cohere into systems and as they change in response to all the conditions that affect human life, calls for an art of revelation as well as a science of analysis. The facts and figures, the complex changing patterns of social behavior, have a meaning beyond themselves. To present them aright we must first seek to understand them....

Abundant controversy has arisen over the question whether there is at all a subject deserving to be named sociology, whether if there is, it is a science, whether in that event it is a generic or a specific science, and so forth.... It may suffice to state at the outset that for us the subject matter of sociology is social relationships as such. This is not the essential, certainly not the exclusive concern of the other sciences included under the rubric of "social". Anthropology studies man.... in terms of the whole scheme of his activities and his products, it is as much interested in his arts and techniques, his myths and superstitions, as in his social institutions. Economics studies man as a wealth-getter and wealth-disposer and inquires into the relations of wealth, (measured by money) and welfare. History studies the record of man, following the time-order of significant events. Psychology studies man as a behaving individual, or, as some prefer to put it, the interrelation between the organism and the world to which it responds.... Sociology alone studies social relationships themselves, society itself. Thus the focus of none of these other sciences is identical with that of sociology, and it is always the focus of interest which distinguishes one social science from another. We should not think of the social sciences as dividing between them physically separate areas of reality. What distinguishes each from each is the selective interest.

Our interest then is in social relationships, as social, not merely as economic or political or religious. These are aspects, not compartments, of society.... Our life as social beings is not made up of our economic life and our political life and our family life and our aesthetic life and our religious life and our club life. We select these aspects for study according to our interest and this is necessary alike for the progress of our knowledge and for practical applications. But in this selecting we are also abstracting from the actual social relationships into which social beings enter and neglecting for the time being the greater coherence of society which consists in the marvelously intricate and ever-changing pattern of the totality of these relationships. We are breaking up in thought, for the convenience of study or for the sake of practical control, that which is indissoluble in reality, and *we cannot or should not be satisfied until our thought has restored the unity which it has taken away.**

To find the focus of our subject matter is therefore of first importance. In particular, we should recognize that in studying society we are not attempting to study everything that happens "in society" or under social conditions, for that happens "in society" or under social conditions, for that

* Italics supplied.

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includes all human activity and all human learning. We shall be concerned with culture, but only for the light it throws on social relationships. We shall not, for example, study religion as religion or art as art or invention as invention. Unless we find and keep some focus we lose our way in the welter of phenomena, and this danger is always besetting the student of sociology. The only way to avoid this danger is to keep our interest focused upon social relationships themselves.²⁸

This clear and admirable statement of purposes and objectives is in sharp contrast with so much that purports to be sociological writing. We illustrate by reference to Sutherland and Woodward, published as late as 1940, who stated

No attempt will be made... to define in formal terms the province of the sociologist. To the question, "What is sociology?" the whole book is the best answer.²⁹

We submit that if two sociologists avoid formal definition in more than eight hundred pages of an introduction to their discipline, considering that the whole study represents such a definition, this represents something less than scientific method or what one should expect from a discussion of any "science". This assumption that definitions are not required, that the field of sociology is so well known as not to require amplification, is also to be found in P. F. Young's *Scientific Social Surveys and Research*, in which the subject matter is again not defined nor indeed can one find a definition of sociology itself.³⁰ Are we to assume that sociology as such is the sum of all its parts, and these are to be defined only by inference or as they relate one to each other or to the whole? We have, then, groups of sociologists avoiding preciseness as well as others attempting to find new bases upon which to build the developing science.

Gillin and Gillin state: "Sociology in its broadest sense may be said to be the study of interaction arising from the association of living beings... It is... the *interaction* and its types that seem to result from contact between human individuals in which we are interested."³¹ A change in direction may be seen here as well as the introduction of biological phenomena which has become increasingly important in recent years in the social studies. The authors, for example, mention the social life of animals as this illuminates the problems of human sociology, but do not go much beyond this beginning.

The same year in which the foregoing appeared saw the publication of a lengthy discussion of social studies by Attberry, Auble and Hunt, in two volumes.³² However, we do not find a discussion of sociology as such—only the field of inquiry within which sociology finds its activity. Despite the length of the work, no definition of sociology is provided and the student

²⁸ R. M. MacIver: *Society: A Textbook of Sociology*. N.Y.: Rinehart & Co., 1937 (11th printing, 1948), xii, 596 pp. Pages v-viii, *passim*.

²⁹ R. L. Sutherland & J. L. Woodward: *Introductory Sociology*. 2nd edition. Chicago: J. B. Lippincott Co., 1940, xii, 836pp.

³⁰ Subtitled: *An Introduction to the Background, Content, Methods, and Analysis of Social Studies*. N.Y.: Prentice-Hall, 1939, xxxvi, 619pp. Useful however, are the bibliographies, pp. 535-598, listing 731 titles, arranged by the subject matter of each chapter of the book.

³¹ J. L. Gillin & J. P. Gillin: *An Introduction to Sociology*. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1947, vii, 806pp. Page 3.

³² G. C. Attberry, J. L. Auble, E. F. Hunt: *Introduction to the Social Sciences. A Survey of Social Problems*. 2 volumes. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1947, Vol. I, xix, 668pp., Vol. 2, xix, 800pp.

is left with the impression that "social science" is all-pervasive, a huge undefined web out of which emerges man's attempt to study himself.

Three years later, in Bogardus, we find that the field of sociology has its definition sharpened on the one hand but broadened on the other hand to include most definitely the utilization of values as its principal preoccupation. Bogardus tells us, "... sociology may be defined as the study of the ways in which social groups function in developing and maturing of personalities through intrapersonal stimulation. In a more advanced sense *sociology* is the study of the social processes which function through social groups in the developing and maturing of personalities."³³ In contrast with others discussion above, he goes on to define additional terminology in the sense in which he uses them indicating their relevance to the general field, to other social sciences and to each other. The general approach, however, has now broadened, and is approaching the estimate of Spicer who tells us that "Like the concepts of physiology and genetics, the concepts of social science are ways of summarizing phenomena for the purpose of thinking out experiments or observations, and understanding the results."³⁴ We note here immediately a profound change in orientation of the science from the years before the war when efforts were rather strenuously made to create the social sciences in the image of the natural sciences. The explanation must be sought in the effects of the war upon social scientists as well as the gradual maturation of philosophy within their disciplines as a result of the varied experiences they faced during the critical years of international chaos. Many realized that the war had come about as a result of what had taken place in the minds of men and not as a result of the interaction of external physical factors. This brought about a determined reexamination of the role of the social scientist in a new world and forecast the present stage of development in sociology and its sister disciplines.

We note even a change of emphasis: the main concern is now directed toward the problems brought about by change as well as the impelling factors which result in change. The scientific nature of the social studies is now an accepted fact: the new problems are those associated with their integration along a broader front than at any time in the century and an approach along more determined lines toward the biological aspects of man and his culture.

Yet, divisions still exist. The last text examined, and the most recent, is one representative of "Catholic" sociology. E. J. Ross is perhaps even more precise in defining the role of sociology than MacIver, and her statement of principles illuminates, it seems to me, a continuing controversy among social scientists as to their role in society.³⁵ Her principal definition is little different from those of thirty years before: "Sociology is the science which studies the structure and function of social relations, customs, and institutions in different groups, and the changes which they undergo." This is supplemented, however, with the credo of the new sociology: "The dynamic importance of sociology lies in the concept of change or development."³⁶

³³ E. S. Bogardus: *Sociology*. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1950, 3rd ed., xiii, 598pp. Page 3. See also the list of references, pp. 575-578.

³⁴ E. H. Spicer (Ed.): *Human Problems in Technological Change. A Casebook*. N.Y.: Russell Sage Foundation, 1952, 301pp. Page 285.

³⁵ E. J. Ross: *Basic Sociology*. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1953, viii, 424pp.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 4.

However, the difficulties are yet to come:

Speaking in general, today it is usually understood that sociologists seek an understanding of social phenomena by the scientific method... for the *establishment of statistical laws*, and for the *formulation of theories* which will account for these laws, as also for the purpose of *predicting* that, given certain conditions and certain variables, then very probably a given social situation will arise.*

The gage thrown down is now made precise. If we accept this definition, then our discussion must revolve around "scientific method", and to this we shall shortly turn our attention. However, we must note here the clear discussion of Dr. Ross of the fields and methods of sociologists:

Within the broad field of induction, sociologists have various approaches to their science. Some are *biological* in their approach and limit themselves to studying the effect of hereditary differences upon such forms of the social structure as classes and institutions.... Others are *cultural* in their approach, vying with modern anthropologists in studying the culture of groups. Others, taking a *historical* approach, compare societies in time and sequence of events. Others devote themselves entirely to the *ecological* approach of Chicago University, or to some other type of ecology. Others are *economic, psychological, demographic, geographical, institutional, or sociometrical* in their approach....**

There are, also, a number of specialized methods employed by sociologists, some of whom employ more than one, while others devote themselves to specialization within a more narrow field. Some sociologists employ the *statistical method*, confining themselves to enumerating situations in a statistical fashion and considering phenomena in relation to each other.... Others employ or test the *ecological method* developed by members of Chicago University. Others make *case studies* of specific types.... Others use the method of *questionnaires* and *schedules*, such as the U.S. Census Bureau, with or without the addition of the *interview method* or personal interviews with selected individuals or groups. Others engage in the *participant observer method* and live with the groups which they are studying; or they may use the *personal document method*.... Then there is the *sociometric method* developed by Moreno and his followers, who include many educators; the method of *group dynamics*, used to study human relationships; the formation of public opinion, and the training of leaders....

All this is clear and straightforward and much to be admired in a field where the discrete has become the fashion. Of more immediate interest to the problems of sociology in the Philippines, and illustrative of the division of opinion within the local scene, is the discussion of Dr. Ross of the Christian in sociology. We must note here the equating of the term "Christian" for "Catholic": this introduction of a divisive note may well be at the root of our difficulties in developing an approach to sociological work in the Philippines.

Some Christians who are sociologists are content to realize that they are specialists within a narrow, though useful field. They recognize the incomplete nature of their work in relation to man as a whole, but they maintain that their religious beliefs have no part to play in their sociological work as such,

* Italics supplied.

** Note, parenthetically, the assumption that the broad field of sociology lies in induction. We will return to this in subsequent pages.

any more than it does in the professional interests of the biologist, chemist, engineer, and mathematician. Canon Jacques Leclercq, of the University of Louvain, himself a philosopher, maintains in his *Introduction a la sociologie* that this should be the view of sociologists. Others, urging that man's social relations cannot be adequately studied without regard to his whole life as an individual, say that Christians who are sociologists must take ethics and revelation into account in their work. Rev. Raymond Murray, C.S.C. . . . wrote in his *Introductory Sociology*. . . that sociology is 'inevitably philosophical,' 'inevitably ethical,' and that a 'Catholic sociology is necessary.' Rev. Paul Hanly Furley, head of the sociology department of the Catholic University, also has argued in favor of a 'Catholic sociology,' that is, that sociology for Catholics differs from that of others and includes theology and philosophy in addition to scientific work. . . . [He defines "Catholic sociology"] as 'the study of human society by the method of observation and experience in the light of principles accepted from philosophy and theology.'

Within recent years, as sociology is developing more in the direction of metrical and quantitative studies, most Christian sociologists tend to agree with Canon Leclercq. . . . Nevertheless they realize that their Christian beliefs about man and religion, and their philosophical background, not only make them see clearly that sociology is not a self-sufficient study of society, but these beliefs also lead them to view sociological undertakings and findings in a different light from those who do not think as they do. They can judge more clearly what particular social relations and institutions need first to be studied by sociologists to provide material for social planners, statesmen, and others who are influential in social action. They can also judge more clearly what important features in addition to the sociological findings must be incorporated by social planners in their final plans. . . .⁸⁷

Dr. Ross then provides for the student seven "facts or truths" from Catholic dogma which she indicates are at the base of all other approaches to man in society.⁸⁸

Now, one does not have to be either a thoroughgoing "heretic" or a determined scientist—of whatever persuasion—to disagree most heartily with these statements. The assumption, first of all, that sociology is based upon induction, the assumptions that Catholic sociologists are in a position to "judge more clearly" than others, the problems of man in society, the belief that sociology is to be a tool of religious social planners, all in themselves are distasteful to one who is convinced of the necessity for the operation of the open wind in attempting to study the problems of modern society. If one begins his work with a series of assumptions, about which the kindest observation one can make is that they represent an unfortunate bias toward a priori thinking, the objective observer can only expect that the results of such work will be something less than wholesome. The sociologist, like the historian, must be earnest in his attempt at objectivity and must avoid satisfaction with himself, his philosophy, or the results of his endeavors. From the inescapable frame of reference, with which every human observer is endowed, he must approach his work with humility and a realization of ignorance and the possibility of error. Do the sociologists actually work as "specialists within a narrow, though useful field"?

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 17-19, *passim*.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

In a strict sense sociology, like history, has for its domain all human affairs in their terrestrial setting and relations: and the great sociologists... have sought to formulate nothing less than a theory or scheme of history covering the forms and evolution of human societies....

...cultural interests, ideas, and practices are conditioning realities for economics and politics... Certain customs, morals, and conceptions of value are indispensable to any kind of large-scale and complicated economic and political functioning. Ethical ideals and aspirations furnish impulses for both.... Then apart from all utilitarian connections many phases of culture may be viewed as ends in themselves, supplementing the care of life, and marking the development of humanity away from the crudities of barbarism.

...While regional characteristics may distinguish cultures, common characteristics may unite them. Religion, beauty, ethics, science, and ideas may be universal in scope, or at all events embrace many nations within their scope. The republic of letters and the arts is a world republic, despite regional colorations and peculiarities. Thus cultural sociology has a worth and a bearing for human beings as such, in their highest as well as their lowest moments, while political and economic affairs are likely to be viewed as purely practical interests. The former may enlarge while the latter constrict. Political and economic systems may change, but the values which mark the good life form a permanent heritage of mankind.³⁹

In 1934, Beard recognized the almost universal scope of sociology, and indicated at least eleven areas of human experience to be analyzed in a study of society: technology, economy (under which is business enterprise and agriculture), health and vitality, family, education, communication, recreation, the arts, government, justice, and tensions and struggles. No matter how one adds or subtracts from this list, these still represent the scope of interest to sociologists; if these are to be attacked from a particularistic bias, how can we expect that illumination will be thrown into the area of human or social problems?

For

The social sciences are concerned with the actuality of society in development... the social sciences deal with both statics and dynamics. Each of the social sciences treats of particular phases or manifestations of the same thing, namely, society in development; they are, therefore, not sharply separated sciences but are linked by the linkage of the actualities which form the subject matters of their observation and study.

The social sciences embrace great bodies of accurate knowledge pertaining to society and social relations in development—knowledge derived from direct observation of society and from the study of records....

The literature of the social sciences may be, for convenience, divided into classes, though they are not sharply separated in fact, namely, *empirical* and *ethical or normative* works....

Contemporary thought in the social sciences is also deeply concerned with exploring the boundaries between empirical and ethical operations in the social sciences....

³⁹ Charles A. Beard: *The Nature of the Social Sciences, In Relation to Objectives of Instruction*. "Report of the Commission on the Social Studies, Part VII," N.Y.: Chas. Scribner's Sons, 1934, pp. 113-115, *passim*.

Empiricism is a precious and indispensable instrument of the human mind for developing exact and accurate knowledge respecting all phases of human society and conduct....

There are many 'areas' of social action to which the empirical method can be effectively applied and there are types of human activity so regular and repetitive that axioms, sometimes called 'laws', may be derived from the study of them, but all such axioms are provisional in character and their continued validity depends upon the course of surrounding circumstances.

The total actuality of society in development... has not been brought within the formula of any 'social law' or 'laws,' and contemporary thought is inclined to the view that the assumptions of physics are inapplicable to the whole range of human affairs....

Contemporary thought challenges the conception that the complete neutrality of empiricism is really applicable in the observation and description of large areas of human affairs....

Hence it may be said that limits have been discovered to the applicability of the empirical method to social affairs and that efforts to push it beyond the boundaries of its applicability have precipitated a crisis in thought. Human beings are constantly confronted by the appearances of choices, small or fateful. Empiricism cannot tell them what they *ought* to do, even though it can often tell them what they *must* or *must not* do if they decide to gain certain ends....

In fine, contemporary knowledge in the social sciences has come back to the old formula for human life which Machiavelli summed up in three words: *necessita, fortuna, and virtu*. It cannot fix their boundaries absolutely or formulate their process in a differential equation, but it can make disclosures in each field... It can describe, without forecasting accurately for any length of time, the tensions which offer the appearances of choice and decision. It can throw light on the human being as a thinking, knowing, creating, achieving personality.

Beyond this it is impossible for the social sciences, in their present state, to go. They cannot foreclose on the future, foretell the exact conditions in which coming choices must be made, empirically prescribe the right choices, or be absolutely certain that instruction in their materials will mechanically produce just the results expected.⁴⁰

To approach human problems, requires a scheme of objectives, and these must be created as much away from the realm of the subjective as possible. Two fundamentals are required:

First, the most accurate picture of the total situation, general and detailed—its complex or related necessities, conditionalities, opportunities, interests, and ideas—the most accurate picture which is permissible to contemporary knowledge.

Second, the most accurate portrayal of movements and changes in this situation, general and detailed, including development, crises, revolutions, modifications, and experimentation... a portrayal so made as to convey to pupils a strong sense of development in time.⁴¹

The dangers inherent in any method of study in which these fundamentals are omitted, or are antagonistic to the scientific spirit of inquiry, may very well affect sociology, and the other social sciences, to the degree

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 157-161, 173, *passim*.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, p. 189.

where we shall return to the point from which growth will be impossible. MacIver pointed out that the beginnings of sociological thought could be traced to the days of Greek philosophy. Yet, a discipline of sociology never merged. To MacIver, the reasons are quite clear—and have significant pertinence to the local scene:

A survey of the social philosophies of antiquity reveals that the birth of sociology required a naturalistic as opposed to a theological conception of human society: a clear distinction between the state and society; and a scientific, or positive, interest in the forms and processes of social relationships, as contrasted with a legalistic or normative interest in the right ordering of these relationships, or the general wellbeing of society. It is here not assumed that the interest of the ethical thinker and that of the social scientist are irreconcilable; a mind devoid of any sense of values would not be fitted to study social institutions and activities, which themselves are impregnated with the valuations of social beings. The normative, or ethical interest is, however, no substitute for the scientific; and unless controlled by the latter, it either prevents or biases the attempt to understand society.⁴²

It seems imperative that this statement be repeated over and over again if progress is to be made in approaching an understanding of Philippine society and cooperation among the various scholars interested in this study is to be achieved. The Philippines is a complex blend of many societies and cultures, acting as a "receiver and transmitter of its Indian heritage, as it had earlier during one of the great waves of migration which swept the peoples of Asia thruout the Eastern world, into the Pacific and on to the American continent. Remnants of this earlier culture are still present in the Philippines and are at present being modified by the action of the later Hinduised Malayan culture, the Spanish *encomienda* system and the American culture wave. The last has swept over the peoples in the Philippines like a gigantic spray of varnish, adhering the least where the oil of the past still clings."⁴³ In attempting to study Philippine culture, therefore, due cognizance must be taken of its Oriental ties as well as its later Western affinities. This is important since MacIver's point relative to the dangers of normative analyses

...is illustrated particularly by the oriental theories of society. A vast amount of the classic literature of both China and of India is concerned with political and ethical philosophy. The social teaching of the sages is devoted to the right conduct of the individual in his various relationships and to the proper function and good order of social categories. But there is practically no social philosophy and still less a sociology which offers a non-moralistic interpretation of the trends of social life, of the dependence of institutions on environmental and cultural factors, of the processes by which individuals become socialized or even of the social problems which beset the patriarchal family system....

...In Chinese social philosophy there is a preliminary analysis and classification of the various types of social relationships, expressed in the *wu-lun*, or five relations, of Confucianism.... But once the classification is posited, the treatment reverts to the ethical....

⁴² In *Ency. Soc. Sc.*, p. 233.

⁴³ C. O. H.: "The Philippines: A Critical Survey," *Indo-Asian Culture*, Vol. II, No. 4 (April, 1954), p. 368.

The treatment of society in the writings of Confucius and the other sages of ancient China clearly illustrates the way in which the dominance of an ethical attitude may inhibit the development of sociology. The thought of Confucius is almost entirely devoted to social relationships. He posits the Aristotelian principal that man is both a rational and social animal and suggests that personal and social equilibrium are intimately interdependent... For this ethical attitude social structure is of minor significance and social change is envisaged only in terms of moral advance or decline.

In the medieval period in Europe the soil was still less favorable for the growth of sociology, for not one of the conditions on which its growth depended was present. The distinction between society and the state was obscured and rendered ineffective by the overruling distinction between the secular and ecclesiastical order, typically viewed as two systems of institutions hierarchically related to each other. If all theories are called sociological which are concerned with the relation of man to man, the conditions of social solidarity, the basis of class distinctions or the general nature of human association, then sociological theories were rife in the Middle Ages, culminating in the architectonic system of the *Summa*. Yet if science is distinguished by method rather than by content, there was no sociology. The reasons for the general barrenness of science in the Middle Ages have a peculiar validity for the social sciences. They lie not so much in the appeal to authority as in the grounds of competence which assured authority in scientific matters. The impediment was not the abstract speculative trend of the age, whose real defect was the limit set to the premises of speculation... The major impediment lay in the conception of law as something revealed, imposed and uniform, with the corresponding view of nature as the material which passively or reluctantly takes the imprint of law. In the human sphere that reluctance was identified with natural depravity and sin, a viewpoint which effectively precluded any objective observation of the patterns and interactions of the social order and any sustained research into the conditions under which in their manifold and changeful varieties they emerge.

...Throughout the whole range of medieval speculation an independent or positive sociology is not approached. The social philosophy remains a priori, derived from a higher source, never the free speculative exercise in system making which follows the discoveries of science and provides an impetus to newer discoveries. Divergent schools disputed the Thomist theory of the *perfecta societas* but they argued from the same premises. If some made much of the analogy between society and natural organism, it was only in a superficial taxonomic representation of the order of relationship and subordination which should exist between the elements of the social body. If they spoke of natural relationships, it was in the sense of relationships accordant with a natural law of an ethical or idealist construction.

In this period society is not yet thought of as an independent focus of theoretic interest and of scientific study. This standpoint, the precondition of sociology, is not possible so long as any one form of association, state or church or economic organization, is conceived of as including or controlling or even as later in Marxist theory, as determining all other types of human relationship. For in so far as these other relationships are thus made derivative, they fall within the ambit either of ethical and religious philosophies or else of the hypothetically master sciences of politics and economics. It is questionable whether a genuine sociology can be established even on the premises of Troeltsch, who, while according an independent existence to religious asso-

ciations, yet defines society in Marxist fashion as 'primarily the social relationships which result from economic phenomena.' The rise of sociology comes with the perception that no one order of social phenomena is adequate to comprehend, directly or indirectly, the manifold activities, processes and trends of society, a perception which itself was advanced by the increasing range and complexity of social relationships which began with the era of modern civilization.⁴⁴

This long excerpt has particular pertinence to our local scene. Since the peoples of the Philippines and the cultures of which they have been a part are blends of east and west, approaches to a study of them must necessarily understand this background and the operation of the ideas MacIver discusses. The Philippines has had Oriental origins, has been subjected to political and religious systems imported from medieval Spain by way of Central America and economic and social systems brought in from the United States. Should the sociologist approach a study of Philippine culture from the orientation pointed out by Bennett and Wolff, without recognizing the relationships of thought-existent in the culture derived from India and China? This has been the common approach and has been carried not exclusively by sociologists. Indeed, most research into Philippine society has been carried on by anthropologists, themselves Western-oriented. It is essential, I believe, for local scholars to determine what their approach will be and how it will be carried out. We must understand that

The rise of 'scientific sociology' in the present century—a signal expression of it is Pareto—has modified somewhat this major concern with the West. Emphasis has shifted toward general laws of social relationships, processes, and forms, and away from involvement with the nature of Western society. But objectives have exceeded accomplishments, for sociologists have continued to focus, as a source of both data and motivation, on Western society or portions of it. The injection of 'science' contains an element of disguise and confusion; while professing to search for general laws, the sociologist continues indulging his concern with his own society, but as a 'scientist' does not admit it. The positivistic phase of sociology thus belies the historical mission of the field: an empirical analysis of the nature and future of the Western world.⁴⁵

This has been mirrored in work in the Philippines whose society has been repeatedly subjected to inquiry in terms of Western society and principles of Western sociology. Since most of this analysis has been carried on by anthropologists (and still is), we should, perhaps indicate the relations between sociology and anthropology, since this will determine to a great extent how future work in the Philippines will be done.

... the anthropologist conscious of his task to interpret the exotic to his Western audience, has ordinarily been less concerned with large theoretical schemes than with detailed portrayals of his topics. To some extent, such portrayals must be made, not in Western terms, but in terms of the cultures studied. Anthropology has excelled in grasping those aspects of human culture which set men off from one another and are meaningful because of their particular quality of uniqueness. From a patchwork of such revelations of the unique, it has hoped to piece together a universal picture of man; and a set of concepts, like 'culture pattern,' which it has evolved, promise well as

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 233-235, *passim*.

⁴⁵ Bennett & Wolff, *op. cit.*, p. 330.

tools for constructing such an image. In this particular sense, anthropology has been more 'scientific' than sociology. In Murdoch's terms...., it studies patterned behavior; sociology, the unpatterned....

From an institutional standpoint, American anthropology has lagged behind sociology in establishing itself as an academic subject, even though it found very early acceptance in museums and research institutes.... (The reverse is true for England, where sociology is largely replaced by social anthropology.) Today, sociology is much more widely taught, and has many more departments and periodical outlets, than anthropology. Perhaps, after all, sociology is the study of our own society, and this may be more appealing than research into the Bongo-Bongo. The different foci of the two fields are reflected in their course offerings: aside from introductory courses, anthropology most frequently teaches areal ethnology, while sociology concentrates on 'social problems.'

'Structural-functional' studies of world areas are engaged in by sociologists often in company with anthropologists...., and the latter are busily beginning to study modern societies and American communities. Methodologically, there seems to be less of a tendency toward rapprochement. In 1927, Edward Sapir expected sociology to be enriched by anthropology now that the two had rejected unilinear evolution, thus permitting a more empirical and functional approach to cultural differences and cultural diffusion... The structural-functional, rather than the cultural-historical, suggestions in Sapir's remarks have since appeared as realistic predictions of subsequent developments in sociology: the study of ethnocentrism, the cultivation of functionalism, and the preoccupation with values (symbolism) have come to be among its prominent characteristics and concerns, while the study of diffusion and formal configurations of culture and cultures has hardly taken hold. Although sociologists have borrowed and used the anthropological notion of cultural diversity and have relied upon anthropological materials to provide a kind of comparative color, they have shown little inclination to engage in comparative studies themselves.⁴⁶

It is, therefore, essential for local students to understand the differences between sociology and anthropology if only to be able to decide (1.) which of the two shall be his choice for a career, or (2.) which will offer the desired point of departure for his work.

... Sociologists and anthropologists approach and perceive man differently; they have different *images of man*. In his search for laws and his interest in the abstract, the sociologist tends to view man as technically 'non-human' item, subject to many forces (including the sociologist's impersonal measurements). In this view, man is an element of nature, immersed in his environment; and the sociological student stands apart, observing and measuring man-in-environment.

For the anthropologist, man is not a figure within a ground, but rather a figure against that ground: he is a *human* phenomenon, everlastingly variable, predictable only within broad limits if at all, and knowable only on a series of virtually infinite levels of understanding. For while the sociologist possesses or strives to possess measuring instruments which obtain precisely defined and selected data, the cultural anthropologist possesses a technically unlimited 'understanding.' While the sociologist purposes to stand away, to perceive man 'objectively,' not to involve his own feelings and reactions, the cultural anthropologist has often striven to know man *through his own feelings and*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 331-332, *passim*.

reactions, to view the human being he studies as 'fellow men,' not as 'subjects.'

... This suggests a difference in *philosophie of method*. The sociologist is expected to be able to use statistical techniques and a battery of specific concepts... The anthropologist... has more frequently encouraged the cultivation of individual intelligence, imagination, and other qualities believed to foster the 'grasp' of the unique...⁴ Thus the anthropologist, in order to obtain an 'objective' view of culture, strongly identifies and empathizes with the behavior of its carriers. This is quite at variance with the standard sociological approach, which instead stresses distance... The anthropologist invites experimentation in contrasting interpretations of the same phenomenon... while the sociologist often strives for the opposite: the standardization of methods so that all observers will obtain the same results...

This points to a crucial area of misunderstanding between the two fields. Many sociologists have great difficulty seeing this individualistic, creative approach as even remotely approximating 'science,' for, perhaps more than any other aspect of cultural anthropology, it offends or threatens their loyalty to objectivity and freedom from bias. Their criticism, on the other hand, is often difficult for the cultural anthropologist to see, because his definition of 'science' emphasizes 'depictive integration' for which the observer's own abilities and views, in all awareness, are essential, rather than threatening, and to be excluded.

The two fields differ with respect to their *structuring of problems*. The sociologist characteristically works with small-scale problems, often with a patchwork of them, all logically connected in such a manner as to permit the testing of a major hypothesis or theory. He generally constructs the dimensions of the problem in advance, often taking his cue from specific data-gathering techniques. The anthropologist, too, usually begins with generalized theoretical interests or hypotheses, but he typically casts them in much broader terms, attempting to obtain data on all relevant levels of analysis...

In consequence of their divergent views of man and the study of man, anthropology and sociology differ with respect to the *selection of phenomena investigated*. Sociology has performed its best work, perhaps, upon structural systems and socio-demographic patterns, while cultural anthropology has made its signal contributions in the study of subtle and involved problems in such fields as magic and religion, sexual behavior, social configurations of emotion, or the evaluational aspects of food-getting techniques... The sociologist finds it difficult to see how the cultural anthropologist 'proves' anything, while the anthropologist feels that 'proof' is irrelevant in the sense that man is man wherever found: the grasp of a single instance of the 'unique' itself is knowledge; no more than for the humanist does its relevance exclusively lie in its candidacy as a 'case' in a required multiplicity of cases, as is demanded by the sociologist before he licenses it as knowledge...

The two disciplines differ with respect to their *fundamental attitudes toward research*. The sociologist stresses non-emotionality, the exclusion of passion from the research enterprise. The anthropologist, on the contrary, expresses fervor and curiosity about his subject matter and proclaims the wonder of man and his works...

⁴ Referring here to Mead & Metraux: *The Study of Culture at a Distance*. Chicago, 1953, 480pp, Especially chapter I.

... There exist differences between the American sociologist's and anthropologist's *conception of temporal sequence and history*. For the sociologist... history has most often meant Western history, which is documented. Hence his attention has been concentrated in specific sequences within a time span of the past few hundred years, and his view of temporal dynamics has been couched in terms of Western categories of time. For instance, Ogburn's 'cultural lag' is based on the Western notion of progress...

For the anthropologist, on the other hand, history and temporal sequence have meant either human history as a whole, or the history of any particular society studied—hence very often the history of societies lacking written history. The anthropologist thus is at home in non-Western time perspectives, which means that his time dimension, too, is deeper than the sociologist's—thousands of years instead of hundreds—and that his sense of historical reality is oriented toward larger and more diffuse phenomena: the development of technology, the growth of the division of labor, of religion, etc.

These differences in the conception of time in turn feed back into the differences in the image of man. Despite occasional lapses into cultural determinism, on the whole, anthropological man is the carrier, vehicle, or creator of Civilization or Culture—history is human; man is historical. Sociological man, on the other hand, illustrates social (Western) laws of which he is not so much the creator as the creature...

... Finally, we may note that anthropology and sociology differ with respect to the *larger aims of their sciences*. Anthropology has been concerned with issues more or less directly related to the question, 'What is the nature of man?' To the more empirical sociologist, this (quite correctly) smacks of philosophy. The anthropologist shares with the philosopher and other 'humanists' the concern with such 'non-objective' questions as the fate of civilization, man's moral integrity, the reality of culture, and other problems sometimes compartmentalized as 'meta-anthropological'... While the sociologist has shown interest in the anthropologist's data—for example, in materials on cultural relativity... on the whole he tends to use such material mainly as illustrations of rather elementary points (see any introductory sociology text) and does not appear to be inclined to build the questions into his own approaches and theories...⁴⁷

Now, there is no logical reason why the differences between the two fields should suggest competition in fields of inquiry or preclude fruitful cooperation between them. It does not suggest that one should approach the fields with the idea of deciding which is the "better" approach to the study of man. The challenges faced by both fields are of a magnitude demanding the fullest utilization of the techniques common to both, for the greater body of literature we assemble on man the more appears yet to be gathered and understood. It seems more than likely that in future years there will be an increasing synthesis of the two fields, echoing Case's prediction of thirty years previous, if for no other reason than the undoubted fact of the increasing complexity of the problems that will face those who will attempt to study and understand man. Branford forecasts this future

Unfortunately, there does not, as yet, exist any monographic study of the typical Region—a river valley, which, from source to sea, can be taken as representative of a given civilization. Indeed, an organization adapted to a

for sociology:

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 334-338, *passim*.

working correlation of all the relevant specialisms: both social and naturalist, has still to be created for this purpose. But there are small tentative beginnings such as the Outlook Tower in Edinburgh, and Le Play House in London. To be sure, many 'surveys' of particular cities, towns, villages, and other areas, have been, and continue to be, made and published, especially in America. But these are social rather than sociological. In other words such usage, systematization and even synthesis of specialisms, as they make and apply to observation and interpretation of their region, are either personal or appertain to some sectional tradition rather than to the main line of sociological advance. It may well be that effective progress towards the establishment and maintenance of sociology as the culminating synthetic member in the hierarchy of the sciences awaits the coming of a generation of students and investigators, observers and interpreters all of whom shall have been specially trained in definite ways.

These, without doubt, must include: (a) a working knowledge of Comte's master-generalization still awaiting thorough going application to recent history and contemporary social evolution as well as to past history, *i. e.*, of congruent temporal and spiritual powers, operating through characteristic social types for which he used as technical terms, 'chiefs' and 'people' for the respective arms of temporal power; and similarly 'intellectuals' and 'emotionals' for those of the spiritual power; (b) a similar habit of using for everyday observation and interpretation, both versions of Le Play's reversible formula (Place, Work, Folk); (c) a working knowledge of Goddes' development and elaboration of the Le Play formula; (d) a preliminary training in biology and in field-naturalist modes of observation and study; (e) some mastery of contemporary resources in (social) geography, economics, and anthropology as the three chief subsocieties of sociology on its objective side, and similarly for ethics, psychology and aesthetics as the three chief subsocieties of sociology on its subjective side; (f) recurrent travel on foot particularly for observation of the elemental occupations with their rural varieties and their transformations in urban life; (g) similar open-air studies of historic formations and their survivals and renewals in town and country; (h) habitual watching (and interpreting) everywhere and at all times of the interplay between past, present, and future; (i) unflagging endeavors to discern the 'individuality' of every village, town and city, as a unique factor in the 'culture' which every region receives and reflects from the larger civilization; (j) a clear distinction between organic heredity and social inheritance; and persistent effort to see and evaluate the social heritage not only in language and literature, art and religion, occupations, manners, customs, business and politics, but also and more concretely in the edifices, streets and quarters of towns and cities; and above all in the complex life of a whole region fully representative of a given civilization.

Equipped with these (and no doubt other) essentials of his science, the coming sociologist will work towards the long delayed synthesis of the newer specialisms and of these specialisms with the older studies and knowledges.⁴⁸

That this grand synthesis must be achieved by young scholars only now beginning their training, as well as by scholars probably unborn, should, it seems to me, be taken as a truism. The present generation, no matter how hard they struggle, are too bound up with the past and present, too inhibited by old prejudices and frames of reference which have become shibboleths to be defended as a means of defending their proponent's position

⁴⁸ *Op. cit.*, pp. 914-915.

in the academic world. Conflict is rife within the social sciences with respect to their ends and methods, despite efforts to take permanent steps toward the creation of one comprehensive social science. An example of this is the plea of the late A. R. Radcliffe-Brown: to him

science discriminates among the systems dealt with. And although he successfully demonstrates that there can be no more than *one* theoretical social science, he also indicates the desirability, in the initial stages of its development, of assuming that various systems can be conceptually isolated. The ultimate social science will be based [*he believed*] upon relational mathematics at a higher level of abstraction than mechanics and a recognition that natural law is not just a convenient generalization that works but rather is immanent in the universe. Two kinds of relations exist in phenomenal reality: the logical or mathematical relationships at the highest level of abstraction, which will be the ultimate concern of the pure social scientist; and the spatiotemporal relationships of the interconnectedness, which can be investigated as mechanical systems by various existing disciplines, though successfully only if departmental lines can be crossed more freely than now.⁴⁹

The conflict between Radcliffe-Brown's prediction and that of Branford is illustrative of the conflicts the social scientist meets at every point in his work: can the study of man be reduced to mathematical equations on the one hand, or should man be studied from a strong ethical or normative base? Is it possible to develop in the social sciences methods, scientifically sound, that will follow a middle road between these two extremes? They are extremes in one sense, but could also be said to only differing methods of the same premise: that is, the mathematical approach can be as normative as the ethical approach, since both erect values by which man and his society are to be evaluated. Both contain the same dangers, the same weaknesses, so clearly discussed by MacIver. Both will rest, ultimately, on the nature of man, and this will inevitably lead back to biology.

In recent years, there has been a growing concern on the part of the natural scientists with problems relating to man in society—including in this instance biologists themselves. Some have posited the suggestion that in biology an approach can be found to the creation of an ethical system for which the natural scientists seem to be seeking. Recourse to biology will lead to psychology and we note, in passing, that "Kroeber and Louie long ago indicated the futility of general psychological principles as an explanation of particular ethnological facts."⁵⁰ However, the efforts and challenge of the natural scientists must be faced. All appeals, by biologists, for the adoption of a scientific approach to ethical problems, Romanell observes

suffer from the general defect inherent in the original set of writings on the ethics of evolution that flourished during the last third of the 19th century: namely, they approach problems of value with the same habits of mind

⁴⁹ William Warnz: "Contributions toward a Macroeconomic Geography: A Review," *Geographical Review*, Vol. 47, No. 3 (July, 1957), pp. 421-422. His discussion above refers to A. R. Radcliffe-Brown: *A Natural Science of Society*, xii, 156pp., The Free Press, Glencoe, Ill., 1957.

⁵⁰ David Bidney, reviewing Brandt's *Hopi Ethics*, in *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 81, No. 1 (July, 1955), p. 49.

and with the same methods of procedure that have proved so successful in dealing with problems of fact.⁵¹

"A scientific approach to ethics, by hypothesis, must be naturalistic. . . . However, proponents of this method defend "a traditional version of what may be more properly identified as 'positivistic Ethics.' By positivistic ethics is meant, essentially, the doctrine that contends that all statements of moral value must be reduced to statements of empirical fact before they can lay any legitimate claim to scientific validity. In a word, the ethics of positivism is thoroughly *descriptive* as against *normative*."⁵² This modern version of positivistic ethics is described as "traditional" because the "up-to-date representatives of the school, armed as they are with a thoroughgoing 'verifiability' theory of meaning, have been stressing vociferously for some time the *emotive* significance of ethics as against the *cognitive* significance, thereby making the whole field of morals a branch of rhetoric rather than a branch of science."⁵³ Many of these modern theorists still retain their "classical faith in the possibility of making a science out of our moral judgment." Many, however, injure their claims by the tendency to "reduce the meaning of terms in the moral context to their biological analogs. . . ." They rest their thesis upon the "reduction of all the fundamental categories of ethics to Walter B. Cannon's physiological concept of 'homeostasis'."⁵⁴ These theorists fail to realize that

any theory that interprets moral conduct in terms other than its own, like the homeostatic interpretation of ethics, rests on the fallacy of reduction. Besides, a proposal to construct a science of ethics is self-defeating if its inevitable outcome is some other science than itself.

For our purposes, it is sufficient to note that, from the premise that social phenomena are biologically conditioned, no valid conclusion may be drawn to the effect that they are merely biological in character. The biological foundation of social phenomena has to do with their common genes, not with their specific characteristics. To assume with Emerson that the genesis of a social phenomenon determines its specific nature is to commit the genetic fallacy. . . .*

These arguments are pertinent to our discussion of the scope of sociology in the Philippines since they relate to a fundamental difference of opinion as to the objectives of sociology here. Romanell's dissection of the homeostatic theory is, therefore, of central interest to our suggestion that our objectives be clearly stated and understood. Those who hold with the normative approach to studying and understanding man in society must inevitably face identification with those supporting "homeostasis". One is as positivistic as the other.

Emerson's positivistic bias comes completely to the fore in the rather impatient way he handles the most comprehensive problem of all philosophy: the relationship of 'is' to 'ought,' which 'underlies any science of ethics' and any moral effort of ours. All that he seems to do with that age-old problem is to explain it away with the remark that, in the moral field, 'our philoso-

⁵¹ Patrick Romanell: "Does Biology Afford a Sufficient Basis for Ethics?" *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 81, No. 3 (September, 1955), p. 136.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

⁵⁴ C. F. A. E. Emerson: "Dynamic Homeostasis: A Unifying Principle in Organic, Social, and Ethical Evolution," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 78, 1954, p. 67.

phical difficulties are more semantic than scientifically real! But what, we query, is more 'scientifically real' than the evident gap in our daily experience between the actual and the ideal? . . . No amount of semantic clarification, however impeccable, can legitimately define away the distinction between the actual and the ideal, because it is precisely the function of that clarification to preserve in *discourse* the very distinction without which no genuine inquiry into ethics is possible. Philosophers, no matter how ingenious they may be in other respects, do not manufacture that distinction out of the blue. Like good empiricists, they first find the gap in our moral experience and then express what they find in the best language they can.

Now, it is this gap in our daily experience that makes the problem of the relationship of 'is' to 'ought' so exceedingly crucial in philosophy.⁵⁴

Thus, analogical reasoning in the field of naturalistic ethics is bound to collapse, if only because it would require the adoption, as a matter of principle, of an etiological conception of scientific theories or laws. When this is done, "then all ethics is necessarily restricted to an *instrumental* function and all its principles are reduced to *rules of prudence*. That is to say, all that could ever issue from the application of such a conception to the field of ethics is a series of hypothetical imperatives in the form of conditional propositions, that would stipulate the means that are necessary to attain certain ends, or at the very most, stipulate the ends that are mutually compatible or incompatible."⁵⁵

The defect of this particular kind of analogical reasoning is illustrated by a consideration of "the differences between the search for moral truth and the search for factual truth. Although all hypotheses in science aim at truth, the truths of ethics are radically different, in part at least, from the truths of fact. Ethical propositions doubtlessly have a factual content, but the characteristic thing about them is their normative content. . . ."

In the social sciences. . . we formulate hypotheses in order to understand what the social facts *are*, but in ethics proper we formulate hypotheses in order to understand what those facts *should be* in terms of human possibilities. Thus the search for moral truth necessitates a mode of equilibrium with our environment that is opposite to that required by the search for factual truth. Whereas, in the latter case, our interest is in making our ideas conform to the environment, in the former case, we are concerned with making the environment conform to our ideals. In other words, the whole purpose of an ethical hypothesis is not to stick to the facts; rather, its purpose is to effect a change in the facts of our environment, physical and social, so that the results will be more in keeping with the ideals we cherish.

Any proposal that calls for the application of the scientific method to ethics, in order to be at all effective, should proceed to designate the *specific form* of that 'logical method' that is appropriate to ethical inquiry. In other words, if all scientific method, regardless of subject matter, involves certain prerequisites for the attainment of reliable knowledge—observational, theoretical, and verificational—then the task of any attempt to apply that method to ethics would be to elucidate exactly what those prerequisites are within the *ethical* context. This is no easy task, of course. . . .⁵⁶

⁵⁴ Romanell, *ibid.*, p. 139.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 142.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 142-144, *passim*. See also: F. S. C. Northrop: *The Logic of the Sciences and the Humanities* (N. Y.: Macmillan, 1948); A. J. Ayer: *Language,*

From a survey of contemporary literature, it is quite evident that many minds are inquiring into the subject matter of the relation of ethics to man's physical nature and attempting to derive therefrom postulates, of meaning to as wide a range of fields as possible, for the conduct of fields of inquiry as well as individuals within science. One of the clearest statements to appear on this inquiry was by Dr. Ludwig von Bertalanffy, who stated quite flatly that "biology is one of the foundations of behavioral science."⁵⁷ The proof of his statement is of paramount importance to the beginning sociologist whose career will be concerned with behavior.

Without entering into epistemological niceties, we may say that the field of science consists of three levels: physical nature; organisms; and human behavior, individual and social....

...The quest for the unity of science often has led to the postulate of reductionism: namely, that biology should eventually be reduced to physics and chemistry, and that the behavioral and social sciences should be reduced to biology. Now biologism, the thesis that human behavior should be reduced to biological terms and laws, is, in some respects a much more serious affair than physicalism, the tendency to reduce biology to physics and chemistry.... The question whether human behavior can be expressed in biological terms is far from purely academic. If we assume that the thesis of biologism is correct, it follows that human behavior is to be considered a particularly involved complex of the ways and factors of behavior that are present in subhuman species, in the same way that, for physicalism, a living organism is a particularly intricate physical system. If human behavior and history are only a product of biological factors, one of the most important factors must be heredity. What really matters, then, is not the individual or the culture but the hereditary substratum of the nation or race, and this quite logically leads to the notion of a master race and eventually to the justification of extinguishing others.

If man is to be considered only from a biological viewpoint, war appears as the continuation of the omnipresent struggle for existence. Since, according to current biological theory, survival and selection in the struggle for existence are the principal motors of evolutionary progress, war appears to be the townstone for the value of a nation or race, and the surviving one has by this very fact proved its superiority. If human behavior and society have, in principle, the same bases as animal behavior and society, it follows that the most desirable form of society would be one like that of ants or termites. Actually these are much more perfect and satisfactory than human society, since there is no social question, unemployment, or frustration of individuals. In other words, what really matters is not the individual but the supraindividual whole of the state, nation, or race. Then the human individual becomes an expendable short-lived cell in the all-important whole.

These consequences, the theory and practice of a master race, total war, and the totalitarian state, are quite logical once the thesis of biologism is accepted. Of course, other and more ingratiating doctrines can be derived equally well from biological considerations. However, if biological categories

Truth and Logic (N. Y.: Oxford Univ. Press, 1936); W. B. Cannon: *The Wisdom of the Body* (N. Y.: Norman, 1932); *Ibid.*, "The Body Physiologic and the Body Politic," *Science*, Vol. 93 (1941); R. C. Cabot: *Adventures on the Borderlands of Ethics* (N. Y.: Harper, 1926).

⁵⁷ "A Biologist Looks at Human Nature," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 82, No. 1 (January, 1956), p. 33 (pp. 33-41).

are taken as the only measure, such consequences do arise easily and actually have in recent history.⁵⁸

We, thus, must refuse to accept biologism as a hypothesis for inquiry into man in society, just as we must refuse to accept ethical systems for the same inquiry, for the same reason. If we begin with the assumption that we know what the meaning of man in society is and ought to be, our system of ethics must be inextricably bound to a religious system, order, or belief—and here both the beginning and the end is known beyond question. This omits the biological in the same fashion that biologism omits the spiritual. Neither can satisfy as being objective or scientific. The history of man in society, as viewed within ethical bounds, has been a grim one, indeed, particularly if we take into consideration man's biological development—as we must:

...If we survey the evolutionary series of brains from the lower vertebrates to man, the characteristic is progressive cerebralization—that is, the increase in the quantity and complexity of the forebrain. What is called human progress is a purely intellectual affair, made possible by the enormous development of the forebrain. Owing to this, man was able to build up the symbolic worlds of speech and thought and some progress in science and technology during the 5000 years of recorded history was made.

Not much development, however, is seen on the moral side. It is doubtful whether the methods of modern warfare are preferable to the big stone used for cracking the skull of the fellow-Neanderthaler. It is rather obvious that the moral standards of Laotse and Buddha were not inferior to our. The human cortex contains some 10 billion neurons that have made possible the progress from the stone axe to airplanes and atomic bombs, from primitive mythology to quantum theory. There is no corresponding development on the instinctual side that causes man to mend his ways. For this reason, moral exhortation as proffered through the centuries by the founders of religion and great leaders of humanity has proved disconcertingly ineffective. If moral progress is possible, it seems so only in the way of inhibition and sublimation. The inhibitory action of higher centers on lower ones is a well-known fact in neurophysiology. It appears that we cannot change the *beste humaine*: we can only hope that the brute in man is better controlled.⁵⁹

The normative, the ethical, approach cannot accept this grim conclusion: "the perfectibility of man" is to ethics not a hypothesis but a fact. If we believe, with Neutra, that "observational curiosity, supplemented by analytic skill, is the basis of the scientific method."⁶⁰—where does this leave the normative method in studying the history of man in society? If the normative method is used by sociologists, can their work be called "scientific sociology"? If this is to be one of the goals of the discipline—as our survey has indicated it has—can sociology be made as scientific in method as physics? "The purpose of theoretical physical science is to postulate a conceptual model of nature from which the observed behavior may be predicted quantitatively. The method is (i) postulate a model based on existing experimental measurements; (ii) check the predictions of this model against further measurements; and (iii) a

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, pp. 33-34.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

⁶⁰ Richard Neutra; in *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 81, No. 1 (July, 1955), p. 38.

just or replace the model as required by the new measurements." Beyond this, we must remember that "physical science is cumulative: that is, the current model includes all the successful parts of previous models. . . . On the other hand, the new model cannot be derived or deduced from the old one—it must be postulated and then tested. New models are often quite radically different from the old ones and often require the abandonment of ideas that have long been considered obvious and axiomatic."⁶¹

This last sentence is the key, and it is this difficulty which the sociologist and the student of human behavior must face, for if once it is agreed that the key to human behavior—to human destiny—has been discovered, further, scientific and fruitful, inquiry becomes impossible. It also stands in the way of much progress within any given field, for old ideas are apt to be emotionally involved with the individual whose life is based upon them.

In September, 1952, a seminar was held, sponsored by the University of North Carolina, to discuss the "biosocial approach" to human problems. The members were "inspired by its potentialities and troubled by its obvious difficulties. The underlying thesis appears to be that the union of the biological with the social sciences would yield superior insight into the etiologies of health and disease and superior plans for providing medical services and care. All the participants seemingly subscribed to the proposition *in general*. Difficulties, however, became evident as soon as an actual union of thought and knowledge was attempted. Some doubted that the time was ripe for extensive collaboration by biology and social science. Others questioned the warrant and validity of a specific designation of 'biologic' and 'social' and what the order of relationships of the one to the other might be."⁶² The attempt at the cross-fertilization of idea from the several disciplines is more hopeful than any attempted union, at the present, of any of them.

Yet, biology is at the base of much human behavior and one aspect in human behavior is unique in the animal world: "The monopoly of man, made possible by the evolution of his forebrain that profoundly distinguishes him from other beings, is the creation of a universe of symbols in thought and language."⁶³

And here the biologist and the anthropologist unite forces and establish a new model for a working hypothesis in understanding man's role in his world:

Man's unique position is based on the dominance of symbols in his life. Except in the immediate satisfaction of biological needs, man lives in a world not of things but of symbols. A coin is a symbol for a certain amount of work done, or food and other utilities available; a document is a symbol of *res gestae*; a word or concept is a symbol of a thing or relationship; a book is a fantastic pile of accumulated symbols; and so forth *ad infinitum*.

Symbols can be defined as signs that are freely created, represent some content, and are transmitted by tradition. It appears that the characteristics

⁶¹ Marshall J. Walker: "An Orientation toward Modern Physical Theory." *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 81, No. 1 (July, 1955), p. 27 (pp. 27-37).

⁶² Iago Galdston: reviewing *Research in Health and Medical Care*, in *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 81, No. 1 (July, 1955), p. 43.

⁶³ Von Bertalanffy, *Op. cit.*, p. 36.

indicated are necessary and sufficient to distinguish symbolism, and language in particular, from subhuman forms of behavior.

By 'freely created' I mean that there is no biologically enforced connection between the sign and the thing connotated. In conditioned reaction, the connection between the signal and the thing signaled is imposed from outside. . . . This does not imply that the choice of symbols is completely arbitrary; probably it is determined by little known psychological principles.

Furthermore, a symbol connotes or represents a certain content, and thus is different from language as expression or as command found also among animals. . . .

Not being an anthropologist, I do not venture a hypothesis on the origin of symbolism and human language. I have strong suspicion, however, that they might be found in imitation and magic.

For primitive man, an image, be it material or acoustical, is the original and gives him control and dominance over it. This is the essence of sympathetic magic. Think of a very primitive and common form of magic. A puppet made of clay is the enemy, and the enemy can be killed if a needle is thrust into the image. When the paleolithic hunters painted those grandiose frescoes of deer and lions on the walls of caves in France and Spain, we may be sure it was not just *l'art pour l'art*, but rather a powerful charm for successful hunting.

The same applies to an acoustical or onomatopoeic image. By naming things, man takes possession of the world in their symbolic images. For this reason, Adam's first work in paradise was to give names to animals, plants, and things. Naming a thing gives power over it. In contradistinction, Yahwe's name is unspeakable. For if His name should be uttered, He would be submitted to the will of him who knows it. The sorcerer evokes the demons of hell by calling their names.

Hence, the assumption that the origin of human language was in verbal magic does not seem to be far-fetched. . . . the sound will be identified with the original just as the clay image is identified with the enemy, and thus, uttering the sound will govern the thing designated. Thus, language may be born of magic, a process certainly infinitesimally slow in its beginnings, but man has had many hundred of thousands of years at his disposal to come from an anthropoid to *Pithecanthropus*, *Sinanthropus*, and *Homo sapiens*.

Whatever the origin of symbolism, its consequences are enormous. The first consequence is obvious. Phylogenetic evolution, based on hereditary changes, is supplanted by history, based on the traditions of symbols. In the biological sphere progress is possible only with an evolutionary timescale. For example, the societies of ants have remained unchanged for the past 50 million years. In contrast, human history has a time-scale of generations, comprising almost all high cultures in a span of 5000 years, and it may even be thought that cultural time has a logarithmic, rather than an arithmetic, scale with changes taking place at an ever-increasing pace.

Second, corporeal trial and error as found in subhuman nature is replaced by reasoning—that is, trial and error in conceptual symbols. . . .

A third and more profound consequence of symbolism is that it makes true purposiveness possible. Purposiveness in a metaphorical sense—that is, regulation of function in the way of maintenance, establishment, and reestablishment or organic order—is a general characteristic of life. . . . This true or Aris-

totalitarian purposiveness is unique to human behavior and is based on the fact that the future goal is anticipated in thought and determines actual behavior.

When man passed the stage of barbarism, he had to realize that verbal magic was impotent. Thrusting needless into the enemy's image did not as a rule kill him. Similarly, a name is just a label attached to a thing and not the thing itself. It is true enough that relics of primitive verbal magic are still with us, much more than is desirable. In speaking of a 'nation,' 'state,' or 'party,' we behave as if those names were things, whereas actually they denote personificative fictions, hypostatizing groups of individuals with their egoistic interests, little intelligence, and exaggerated passions for mythical entities.

If verbal magic was deceptive, another sort of symbolic magic was discovered that was extremely powerful. We may call it the magic of the algorithm.

An algorithm is a system of symbols connected according to preestablished rules. . . . Thus an algorithm means a machine thinking, performing operations by suitable connections of symbols, and giving results difficult to attain or unattainable otherwise. Or, conversely, calculating and thinking machines, mechanical or electronic, are only the materialization of algorithms. Algorithmic magic is commonly known as science and scientific technology.

So long as symbols stand alone they are unproductive and do not convey more information than that contained in the individual symbols. . . .

This is profoundly altered if symbols are combined according to established rules of the game, if they are elements in an algorithm or, as we may say, if a language has not only a 'vocabulary' but also a 'grammar.' Then the system of symbols becomes productive and fertile. . . . If the symbols, as well as the grammar, are well chosen, the result of the mental operation of symbols will correspond to that of the real course of events. The consequences of the images will be the images of the consequences, to use Heinrich Hertz' expression.

In this way a true magic is possible with systems of symbols. We can predict facts and relationships still unknown, can control still unrealized combinations of natural forces, and so on.

Science, to a large extent, consists in the invention, elaboration, and application of suitable algorithms. . . .

The universe of symbols, although created by man, wins a life of its own, as it were. The development of the Roman law, the British Empire, the atomic theory from Democritus to Heisenberg, or of music from Palestrina to Wagner, is certainly borne by a number of human individuals. But it shows an immanent logic that widely transcends the petty personalities, the human and all-too-human creators. . . .

Besides these triumphs of symbolism, there are, however, its pitfalls. The conceptual anticipation of future events that allows for true purposiveness is at the same time the origin of anxiety in regard to the future and fear of death, which is unknown to brutes. The invention of the symbolic world is the fall of man. The notions of sin and evil arise with the invention of symbolic labels attached to certain forms of behavior. War also is a human invention. It is not a biological phenomenon, the continuation of the omnipresent biological struggle for existence. . . . war is caused by head hunting, illusions of grandeur, ideologies, economic reasons based upon symbol-charged values, religion—all of them only superficially different kinds of verbal magic.

This, however, leads to the ingratiating conclusion that war is not a biological necessity and that it would not be unavoidable if mankind would put its symbolic abilities to better use.

. . . In some way or another, it seems that behavioral science is supposed to contribute to the pressing problems of our epoch, not only in the way we invent nice little theories, mathematical models, and so forth, but also in the critical state that the social organism seems to be in at the present time. . . .

The modern methods of propaganda, from the advertisement of a toothpaste to that of political programs and systems, do not appeal to rationality in man but rather force upon him certain ways of behavior by means of a continuous repetition of stimuli coupled with emotional rewards or punishments. . . . Not that this method is new in human history. What is new, however, is that it is applied scientifically and consistently and so has unprecedented power. . . . Furthermore, to apply this method successfully, the conditioning process must be adjusted to the greatest common denominator; that is, the appeal has to be made to the lowest intelligence level. The result is mass-man — that is, abolishment of individual discrimination and decision and its replacement by universal conditioned reflexes. . . .

However, precisely because of the predominance of psychological techniques, realization of the motive forces of human behavior becomes the more important. Herein lies the responsibility of the science of human behavior. Besides the menace of physical technology the dangers of psychological technology are often overlooked. Perhaps even more dangerous than the material existence of the bombs are the psychological forces that may lead to the dropping of them.

As we try to put atomic energy to peaceful use, it may even be more urgent to try to intelligently use the psychological mechanisms revealed by behavioral science.⁶⁴

This all points to the danger of permitting sociology to be utilized by special groups for special purposes or for particular aims. Whether it is a Hitler using the knowledge of sociology to produce a "master race" and to achieve a "place in the sun" or a group identified with a religion seeking to bludgeon a populace into accepting their dogma and beliefs as ineluctable "facts" — the end result is the same: loss of freedom for the individual who becomes submerged into a totality of whatever nature. One of the objectives of sociology, as several of our authorities have indicated, is social control, and this, in the present era, contains seeds of horror.

The Philippines is a part of a greater world passing thru a transition period, which like all such periods is one of uncertainty and confusion. We note, within the Philippines, the internal cultural conflicts resulting from rapidly changing patterns of living and from the constant necessity of discarding old ideas and developing new concepts.⁶⁵

The kinship systems and obligations of nonliterate peoples, religious dogmas and hierarchies, police forces, and actuarial systems are all mechanisms of social control. They are devices whereby men, once having established their social life, seek to prevent it from falling apart. These are the empirical realities of social life at the human level, and no one would deny that human

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 36-41, *passim*.

⁶⁵ J. Rud Nielsen: "Our Responsibility as Scientists," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 81, No. 2 (August, 1955), p. 65.

beings strive to prevent the society in which they live from becoming disorganized. It is another matter, however, to urge that processes of control are *ineluctable* in their implementation, that they tend to maintain society at the level of highest efficiency, and that the movement of mankind is toward greater and greater 'social homeostasis'; for in the case of any empirical test such conditions cannot be demonstrated. Furthermore, so it seems to me, one cannot develop a cogent theory of human evolution on the hypothesis of social stability, but one can do it easily on a hypothesis of social instability.⁶⁶

It seems essential that sociologists should consider very seriously these observations and to proceed with their work on the basis of the latter hypothesis, and if, after careful scientific inquiry, it proves untenable, so much the better; but at least the inquiry was begun from an objective basis.

It is clearly our duty to be as good scientists as our abilities and opportunities permit. This means, first of all, that we should cultivate those attitudes that are essential for scientific work: intellectual integrity, respect for facts, tolerance, courage, and humility.

In public discussions much confusion and misunderstanding arise because speakers fail to make their different viewpoints clear. As scientists we have a special responsibility to make clear the position from which we speak. Moreover, we should always adopt points of view as general as possible, so that we may have the largest possible ground in common with those with whom we talk. Special tenets of professional, partisan, or sectarian nature should always be left out of public discussion. A fundamentalist and an atheist can have a profitable discussion about religion only if both, for the purpose of the discussion, adopt an agnostic point of view and use the word *god* to designate a prevalent and important human concept.⁶⁷

It is here that sociology is so sharply contrasted from philosophy: one can be Aristotelian or Thomistic as a philosopher, but it is absurd to speak of an Aristotelian or a Thomistic or a Catholic or a Protestant sociologists. Is not such a tag attached to a discipline of the social sciences a limiting and constricting one? Does it not do great disservice to the vast body of men and women not members of the academic or scientific world? And is it not this body of human around whom the social sciences revolve and to whom the fruits of research are directed?

We should keep in mind that many of their problems are directly or indirectly caused by science. If they have had to give up old ideas, or cherished beliefs have lost their old meanings to them, we should be ready to help them find new ideas or new meanings. It is often claimed that science is concerned only with facts and has no regard for values.... However, it is wrong to assume that science has nothing to offer as a basis for ethics. Indeed, the very integrity that forbids the scientist to let feelings or human value judgments color facts is an ethical quality, as are many of the other principles or attitudes that are prerequisites for, or by-products of, scientific work. In some scientists, at least, they may well be said to constitute what Einstein called a cosmic religion.⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Nielsen, *op. cit.*, p. 66, *passim*.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Jules Henry: "Homeostasis, Society, and Evolution: A Critique," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 81, No. 6 (December, 1955), p. 308 (pp. 300-309).

Indeed, the problem of ethics in science—any science—is a growing one and will become increasingly perplexing in the years to come. The sociologist, because of his orientation toward values in human society, may be called upon to assist in the solution of what are becoming frightening problems. For example, A. V. Hill points to the problem of increasing population and "raised the question of whether it would not be wise to hold back the application of medicine and hygiene from backward people in order

... to keep in step with other parallel progress so that developments could be planned and orderly? Some might say yes, taking the purely biological view that if men will breed like rabbits they must be allowed to die like rabbits, until gradually improving education and the demand for a higher standard of living teach them better. Most people would still say no. But suppose it were certain now that the pressure of increasing population, uncontrolled by disease, would lead not only to widespread exhaustion of the soil and of other capital resources but also to continuing and increasing internal tension and disorder, making it hard for civilization itself to survive. Would the majority of human and reasonable people then change their minds? If ethical principles deny our right to do evil in order that good may come, are we justified in doing good when the foreseeable consequence is evil?⁶⁸

Can such a question be answered only thru ethics or should recourse to science and the scientific method be made? If the former, the sociologist will step out of the picture in favor of the philosopher or the religious mentor of a people. If the latter, then scientific method must be understood thoroughly before steps are taken which seek to utilize it.

Nielsen states: "If scientists are to render effective aid in resolving cultural conflicts, they must find means of overcoming the handicaps of specialization...."⁶⁹ He might well have extended this to all fields in which science is expected to be of assistance. But before these handicaps are avoided, science itself—in all its meanings—must be understood both by scientists and non-scientists. This, perhaps, can be accomplished by clear exposition of the *results* of scientific method, but, more logically, the philosophy of science must be explored.

A philosophic appraisal of science seems to me to involve four main areas: (i) the methodology of the sciences; (ii) the synthetic view of nature that results from the results achieved in the sciences; that is the formation of a cosmology; (iii) the value commitments of science; and (iv) the impact of science on civilization....

What is scientific method? Philosophers and scientists have written tome after tome in answer to this question, and the discussion rages yet today. The philosophy of science has been mainly a philosophy of scientific method.... Each of these views needs analysis, but underlying them all is an ambiguity from which much of the disagreement stems. This is an ambiguity in the phrase *scientific method*. The ambiguity is seen in the following questions: By what method was the law discovered? By what method is the law justified?

Scientific method sometimes refers to the art of discovery and at other times to the rigorous procedures of verification (justification). Failure to

⁶⁸ Quoted by Nielsen, *op. cit.*, p. 70. Hill, a biologist, a Nobel prize winner and a member of Parliament, made these remarks in his presidential address to the British Association, in 1952.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 66.

distinguish this ambiguity has led to endless debate concerning whether or not 'scientific method' can be formulated in a series of definite, related steps that any intelligent person could apply....

The distinction between scientific discovery and scientific justification explodes the ambiguity in the term.... Neglecting important details, the whole procedure is briefly as follows. (i) The activity of scientific discovery under conscious direction or as a result of some surprising peripheral accidents turns up a new conjecture that has explanatory possibilities. (ii) This conjecture under analysis yields a critical reformation called a hypothesis. (iii) The hypothesis necessarily implies certain definite consequences, some of which can be experimentally checked. (iv) The hypothesis, plus consequences, provides a representation and/or explanation of empirical data already known and in some cases predictions about unrelated data. (v) The conformity of such consequences is checked with the best reliable evidence available at that time.

Now this general procedure exemplifies a basis logical pattern as follows. (i) If the hypothesis is assumed to be true, then certain consequences can be expected to result. (ii) The resultant consequences are in conformity with the relevant empirical data or not. (iii) If there is conformity between consequences and data, then the hypothesis may be an explanation. (iv) If there is no conformity between consequences and data, then the hypothesis has one strike against it....

The afore-mentioned steps can be thrown into the logical form: H then G ; C is true (conforms); or C is false (disconforms). Now logics proves that if C is true, we cannot assert the truth of H because some other hypothesis might also have the same consequences. What this means for us is that no matter how successful the continued conformity between consequences and data, the truth of the hypothesis cannot become a certainty. It remains a probability, albeit in some cases, a very high one.

This fact about the nature of what I am calling scientific method has been subject to much misinterpretation, and I must clear away this rubbish before I state its proper merits and limitations. The first misinterpretation is the claim that 'science can never hope to reach the truth.' Since science cannot reach the truth, then its results are not of cognitive importance; they tell us nothing about reality'. And if science cannot reach the truth, we will have to turn to something else that can. The usual twist at this point is that something like religion can break through to the truth. The variations played on this theme are legion. The fallacious assumptions underlying this misinterpretation are (i) that something called 'certain truth about reality' lies around the corner, and (ii) that any cognitive enterprise that deserves the name will contain a method capable of 'latching on' to this truth. But I am at a loss to understand the reasons for either assumption in a way that does not beg the question at issue. Such is the misinterpretation coming from the absolutist, whatever his breed.

The converse misinterpretation comes from the skeptic to the effect that if science does not give us the truth with its careful critical formulation and experimentation, then nothing can. It is merely an instrument to power, an amusing pastime whose results are arbitrary and even sometimes conflicting....

The curious thing to me is that the skeptic and the absolutist share the same assumptions from which their converse misinterpretations follow. Each finds a gap between the results of scientific knowledge and certain truth. The absolutist must bridge the gap by some leap of faith, and the skeptic makes

an idol of his ignorance of certainty. Is there not a middle ground concerning scientific knowledge?

Both of these misinterpretations rest on false assumptions. What reasons do we have for assuming what is called certain truth about matters of fact? Do we have a single example with sufficient evidence? Why must knowledge be certain in order to be called knowledge? Let us simply state what we have in scientific knowledge. It is reliable information relevant to a context of data. It enables us to understand and predict. It is subject to change. It cannot lay claims to absolute truth, since other hypotheses are always possible. Against the skeptics, it provides us with accurate knowledge about matters of fact—knowledge that is tested in a market place open to all interested parties, knowledge that can settle issues of dispute. Against the absolutists, its logic explodes any claims to infallibility—claims that all too often in man's history have led to intolerance and totalitarianism, political, religious, and social. These are its merits, and I confess that I do not see how these can be construed as limitations. You cannot ask it to do what by its very nature it cannot achieve; that is the height of foolishness; and if your limitations are based on such inability, they are not limitations at all.⁷⁰

These misinterpretations have led to others, particularly in physics where a distinction has arisen between mechanical and mathematical explanations of nature. Out of this distinction has grown what Dr. Schmidt calls "pessimistic physics" which assumes the existence of "an external nature of reality to be known by science, and (ii) that the success or failure of science is to be measured by the degree to which it gives us knowledge about external nature or reality.... Our understanding need not be shocked by the changing character of nature unless some yearning for the absolute unchanging reality holds us. I see no reason why it should."

The misinterpretation that leads to pessimistic physics has its converse fallacy. This is the reification of abstractions or what Whitehead calls the fallacy of misplaced concreteness or Dewey's fallacy of selective emphasis. Persons who fall into this trap agree with us in rejecting the notion of a reality behind scientifically observed events, but they take the description of nature given by science at some stage that utilizes certain abstract concepts and postulate this selected emphasis as the way nature really is. They take the abstractions convenient at one stage of science to be real unchanging objects of nature. There is nothing in scientific method itself that would warrant taking either of these extremes.

There is an old argument concerning whether the social sciences are sciences. Now, there are various reasons why some persons wish to claim that the social sciences are not sciences: (i) some fear that they will invade and make public the hidden, private side of life; (ii) some fear that they will destroy certain moral sentiments, beliefs, and deeply rooted principles (prejudices); (iii) some fear the loss of the freedom of the will; and (iv) some identify science with physics, believe it or not. All of these reasons stem from two sources: (i) the confusion of the broad and narrow views; and (ii) the rejection of the aforementioned aims of scientific method.

But there is no reason why the social sciences should 'hamstring' themselves with the method of physics. No evidence has been presented to show

⁷⁰ Paul F. Schmidt: "Some Merits and Misinterpretations of Scientific Method," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 82, No. 1 (January, 1956), pp. 20-22, *passim*.

intrinsic reasons why they cannot seek and progressively attain the goals of scientific method in the broad sense, although the path be slow and long. To deny this is to limit scientific method to the narrow sense. On the other hand, to reject the social sciences as sciences because one rejects the goals of scientific method in the broad sense begs the question, for it rejects science *in toto*. Such a rejection cannot be argued on pain of contradicting oneself. Thus I can see no inherent limitation on what subject matters can be treated scientifically in the broad sense, and I consider this lack of limitation a distinct merit of scientific method.

But some may wonder whether I mean this conclusion to apply to such subjects as history, philosophy, and religion. I confess that I do, ... In the light of the goals I stated for scientific method in the broad sense—the critical attitude, objectivity, evidence, and logic—I see no reason why these are not the goals of investigation in history, philosophy, and religion. The particular method worked out to achieve these goals will probably vary, but surely the historian and philosopher demand (i) that the results be taken with a grain of doubt, (ii) that other historians and philosophers can arrive at the same conclusions, given the same evidence and rules or procedure, and (iii) that they follow that evidence and logic wherever it leads. There is some discussion these days on whether these are the goals of religious study. If religious do claim factual or moral truths, I do not see how they can avoid these goals. If religions claim some other goals, they need to be made clear.

... the goals of scientific method are incompatible with dogmatism, because the logic of scientific method is such that a hypothesis cannot be claimed as a certainty. By dogmatism I mean (i) the adherence to a belief as absolutely certain, or (ii) the acceptance of a belief as true without sufficient evidence, or (iii) the adherence to a belief in the face of refutatory evidence. The possession of an undogmatic mind, that is, a tolerant mind, seems to me a central value for civilization. It is an ideal few possess. Not many scientists possess it generally but only within some limited field that is their specialty. It is a value, the worth of which has been continuously manifest in the genuine practice of scientific method. Tolerance seems to me one of the central values to the thesis that man alone is sufficient to solve his problems. Lack of tolerance is what continually wrecks the human solutions of man's problems.

The second value ingredient in scientific method is objectivity. By objectivity, I mean the specification of procedures for evaluating relevant data such that conformity to these specifications yields agreement among inquirers. I do not mean by objectivity what has sometimes been expressed as finding out how things really are, independent of observers. The latter is a false quest for two reasons: (i) we cannot get rid of the observer; and (ii) we have no direct access to reality by means of which to check the degree of objectivity obtained. The tentative agreement brought about by objectivity is a necessary part of public knowledge that is undogmatic in its claims. Without objectivity the value of tolerance would collapse into the most anarchistic relativism, because there would be no means for resolving disagreements. The value of objectivity to the quest for knowledge is thus manifest. I consider it a distinct merit of scientific method to bring out the basic values of tolerance and objectivity for the solution of man's various problems.⁷¹

These observations seem ineluctable, yet how few there are who by definition follow the scientific method discussed so clearly by Dr. Schmidt.

⁷¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 22-24, *passim*.

We have only to look around us to note one aspect of what has become identified with "scientific method"—an "inevitable trend toward seeking immediate results by high specialization... within the various phenomena of a single culture, and even within the narrow limits of a single method of analysis."⁷² It is sadly true that "scholars have become adepts in the trivial... neglecting the general principle that a truth can be established among natural phenomena only if the base is wide." Dr. Brown's discussion of the relation of the humanist to the general study of man in society can well be taken to the heart of the sociologist:

... It seems essential to expect that there will be a recognition of the presence of the individual man in every investigation, even though this admits an element of subjectivity. This must, of course, be modified by an ironic perception of the limits, not only of one's own competence, but also of the subject matter; and these limits are in themselves also relative. The humanist necessarily recognizes that he may be wrong, even in talking about his own field of interest. If he is to be accurate in his surmises, he must study the human being at the heart of any artistic or intellectual creation; and he must recognize that the unity of knowledge, if it is to exist usefully as an explanation of the phenomena, depends on the discovery of unity in man himself rather than in the external world...

Neither scientist nor humanist should be surprised, therefore, if there is an invariable lag between the arrival of a new science, a new technique, a new theory, or even a new world-view, and its general and fruitful acceptance and use by humanists; there is a similarly comprehensible delay before a new outlook among humanists and artists is recognized by scientists. One can sympathize with the impatience of those who seek an immediate synthesis of the two outlooks, but it may be suggested soberly and conscientiously that we are all better off for the presence around us of great diversities of outlook, methods of argument and investigation, and objectives. Disharmony of method and outlook will remain as long as scientist and humanist remain true to their callings, as long indeed as they remain men. All we can legitimately hope for is that we may each achieve, in the realm of intellectual objectives as elsewhere, by means of constantly renewed effort, the comprehension and mutual confidence that grows where differences are recognized and encouraged for their fruitfulness.⁷³

And, we might add, where no one belief or method seeks to swallow all others into itself or seeks to make its explanation a universal law permitting of no dispute.

Sociology, then, at mid-century, finds itself rapidly growing to maturity on the one hand and towards obfuscation on the other. There is no question as to its importance as a tool in the study of man in society.

The practical problems of a society subject to rapid and drastic change, the conflicts of mores and social practices within the complex life of a modern civilization and the growth of a positivist as contrasted with a normative attitude toward society itself have led to a widespread development of sociological modes of thought. This is attested not only by the rise of sociological schools and systems, by the impact of sociology on the study of politics, laws, economics and history, by the extensive application of sociological principles to educa-

⁷² Harcourt Brown: "Science, Humanities, and Artifacts," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 83, No. 4 (October, 1956), p. 173 (pp. 169-175).

⁷³ *Ibid.*, p. 175.

tional practice, to the treatment of crime and the like but also by the permeation of sociological interest into general literature. While such literature at all times affords rich materials for the sociologist, modern popular literature has consciously and in abundant measure dealt in sociological terms with social situations and problems. There is in this respect a marked difference between the novels, plays and periodicals of the present time and those of a century ago.⁷⁴

This presents a challenge to the sociologist, at once making his task more difficult while it popularizes its function. There has, therefore, been developed a "great arsenal of secret weapons"⁷⁵ for the study of human behavior and it has been through the use of these that the social scientist has approached his task. With the development of these (secret only in the sense that the subject is unaware of their use), the sociologist has even a greater responsibility to his audience than ever before, because he must now justify both his objectives and the methods he uses in attaining these. He must work continually for a clarification of his purpose and this must be addressed "to society at large". And the most effective way to do this "is by continually communicating findings of current research in understandable language to the public audience."⁷⁶

This, then, should be the program for the sociologist in the Philippines: First, to understand the methods and objectives of science; secondly, to understand how these may become the goals of social science; thirdly, to decide what aspect of sociological inquiry is to be his career and to prepare specifically for a career in social science by following the suggestions of Branford and Schmidt; fourthly, to make of his work the "cosmic religion" mentioned by Einstein (while holding to himself whatever particular religious beliefs he considers necessary); fifthly, following academic preparation, to avoid teaching until after extensive field experience; and sixthly, to engage constantly in coordinated programs of research and to communicate regularly the findings of this research to his colleagues in his discipline (and those allied therewith) and to the general public.

Above all, the sociologist in the Philippines must avoid like poison the temptation to align himself with any sectarian or professional movement or ideology which will nullify his objectives in becoming a scientist concerned with *man in society*.

It seems to me that the principal desideratum of social study in the Philippines is to gain an understanding of the *process* of social change, while at the same time describing the change itself. This is still undefined in modern texts or sociological studies and this can be accomplished here only by a realization that adherence to dogma will be the death of free inquiry. Is the attitude of Ross responsible for the sterility of Philippine sociology? Young people are trained in this attitude and return to their society to teach and not to investigate it. Is this because of fear? Or is it because of the belief that only priests or especially trained religious persons should attempt to analyze society? The marked divergence in the viewpoint of Ross and that of other sources examined, points up the diver-

⁷⁴ MacIver, *Enc. Soc. Sc.*, pp. 245-246.

⁷⁵ Edward Gross: "Social Science Techniques: A Problem of Power and Responsibility," *The Scientific Monthly*, Vol. 83, No. 5 (November, 1956), p. 242 pp. 242-247).

⁷⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

gence of view of what sociology should be in the Philippines. Can these greatly differing views be reconciled, and if so, how? In the event they cannot, what will be the future of sociology in the Philippines as a field of human endeavor? It seems to me that there can only be two alternatives: either it will be utilized as a tool for special interests—out of which will come disaster; or, it will disappear, being absorbed by those social sciences which will be strong enough to resist attempts at social control through preemption of their fields.

Whether these observations are justified by what has been assembled in this article, will be, in the words of C. M. Case, "a question to be answered more by the logic of events than by the logic of the sciences."

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 - A. Biological Schools:
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Branford says: "The great bulk of sociological literature is either specialized on some one or more of the many approaches (economic, anthropologic, psychological, juristic, etc.), or proceeds by a method more dialectical and discursive than observational and hence belongs rather to social philosophy than to science. The best of both kinds will be found either in the specialized journals or in the general reviews." (*Ency. Brit.*, Vol. 20, p. 915). He cites, as chief of the general reviews, the (British) *Sociological Review*, *The American Journal of Sociology*, *Social Forces*, the *Journal of Applied Sociology* (both of these being American), *Année Sociologique*, which summarizes the chief books for the year reviewed, *Revue Internationale de Sociologie*, and many in German, here not cited. Branford refers the student to the following:

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DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIOLOGY IN THE PHILIPPINES

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Sociology in the Philippines is an outcome of decades of sociological development in Europe and the United States, a movement which began with August Comte and progressed further through Herbert Spencer, Professors Zimme, Ward, Sumner, Small, Giddings and Ellwood. For the purpose of this study, the discussion will be confined solely to the development of Sociology in the Philippines, rather than the proof of the existence of Philippine Sociology which to the writer's mind is as yet non-existent. Although on the surface, one may be led to believe that there is one in the making.

The methods used in this study are the examination of early and contemporary sociological offerings in colleges and universities and careful interpretation of the emphasis given Sociology from the earliest period to the present.

The Early Development. Our records reveal that this country's interest in Sociology dates back to 1899—with emphasis on *Social Philosophy* and a light interest in *Penology* and *Criminology*. In 1911, the appearance of *Social Ethics* and *General Sociology* in the curriculum of practically all private colleges and universities in Manila was noted. In the same year, the first course in Sociology was recorded in the University of the Philippines. A few years later, a section devoted to Sociology was organized under the department of Anthropology. This arrangement continued until 1946. The situation was blamed on poor facilities and the lack of well-trained Sociology instructors.

By 1919, the interest in Sociology had spread to the Visayan Islands but the textbooks used throughout the archipelago were of Occidental origin. For lack of local materials on the subject then, these textbooks met the immediate needs of the time.

In 1939, Macaraig's *Introduction to Sociology* appeared in response to a long felt need for a local approach to Sociology. The treatise revolved around the Filipino culture and its beliefs; it further elaborated on the general sociological principles of the Occident as applied in the Philippines. The book remained in demand for almost ten years. At about this time, subjects in Social Work also appeared in the State University curriculum. Meanwhile, the need for more up-to-date social data was again felt. Western Sociology textbooks provided the answers once again, but lack of locally written Sociology texts inevitably gave way to ill-prepared outlines based on textbooks from the West. Although the Western textbooks helped fill the needs then, this measure did not help to enrich our sociological "tool-kit" nor the development of social thoughts in this country. In most cases, Sociology was taught only as a purely normative subject, and the analysis of sociological principles was oftentimes, if not totally, overlooked.